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L Introduction
The United States Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals have
waged war on constitutional tort lawsuits.! The playing field is motion prac-
1. See, e.g., David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 US.C. §1983: InterpretiveApproach
and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 497, 549 (1992) (contending that
Supreme Court's qualified immunity standard overly protects governmental officials and is
inconsistent with Congress's intent); Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: QualifiedImmunity
in the Age of ConstitutionalBalancing Tests, 81 IOWAL. REV. 261,268-69 (1995) (arguing that
Supreme Court's use of open-ended standard for qualified immunity allows judges to apply
qualified immunity in "arbitrary orbiased ways" againstplaintiffs); KitKinports, Habeas Corpus,
Qualified Immunity, and Crystal Balls: Predicting the Course of Constitutional Law, 33 ARIZ.
L. REv. 115, 116 (1991) (contending that federal courts' "actual application [of the qualified
immunity defense] in many cases is completely unjustified by any relevantpolicy consideration");
Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J.
1719, 1720 (1989) (arguing that Supreme Court has used tort rhetoric to "limit the scope of
§ 1983" civil rights actions); David Rudovsky, PoliceAbuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?,
27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.REv. 465,501 (1992) (stating that "[a]s long as the courts and both federal
and state government treat police abuse as a series of isolated incidents, or as a regrettable by-
product of the war on crime, the Monroes, Rafts and Rodney Kings will continue to pay an
unconscionable price for our misguided policies"); Eric Harbrook Cottrell, Note, Civil Rights
Plaintiffs, Clogged Courts, andthe FederalRules ofCivilProcedure: The Supreme Court Takes
a Look atHeightenedPleadingStandards inLeatherman v. Tarrant CountyNarcotics Intelligence
& Coordination Unit, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1085, 1106 (1994) (contending that appellate courts'
adoption of heightened pleading standard for constitutional tort actions might encourage officials
to disregard constitutional rights because plaintiffs would lose lawsuits under that standard);
Matthew V. Hess, Comment, Good Cop-Bad Cop: Reassessing the Legal Remedies for Police
Misconduct, 1993 UTAHL. REV. 149,203 (1993) (stating that"the full potential of[constitutional
tort] remedies has been crippled by overly restrictive judicial rulings and statutes that are
unresponsive to social change"); Alison L. Patton, Note, The Endless Cycle ofAbuse: Why 42
U.S.C. § 1983 Is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 755 (1993)
(contending that Supreme Court's interpretation of § 1983 has made lawsuits for plaintiffs almost
impossible to win against police officers who have violated the Constitution); Clay J. Pierce,
Note, The Misapplication ofQualifiedImmunity: UnfairProceduralBurdensfor Constitutional
Damage Claims Requiring Proof of the Defendant's Intent, 62 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1772
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tice, notthe courtroom.2 Today, the flurry of pretrial motions engulfs the appel-
late courts,3 not just the district courts. In the appellate courts, officials have
asserted, before a trial has occurred4 and sometimes even before discovery,5
qualified immunity from paying damages for alleged constitutional violations.
In deciding these pretrial appeals, appellate courts have assumed powers that
they do not have. They have granted governmental officials qualified immunity
by discarding jurisdictional limitations,6 rewriting the Federal Rules of Civil
(1994) (arguing that "courts are not justified in increasing procedural burdens beyond the levels
normally required under the Federal Rules").
2. See, e.g., Clintonv. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1651 (1997) (statingthat"[m]ost frivolous
and vexatious litigation is terminated at the pleading stage or on summary judgment, with little
if any personal involvement by the defendant"); Karen M. Blum, QualifiedImmunity: A User's
Manual, 26 IND. L. REV. 187, 206-07 (1993) (contending that procedural aspects of qualified
immunity defense have confused courts and practitioners); David Rudovsky, The Qualified
ImmunityDoctrine intheSupreme Court: JudicialActivism andthe Restriction ofConstitutional
Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 23, 67 (1989) (stating that "as the [Supreme] Court has shaped and
reshaped the substantive elements of the [qualified immunity] defense, it has had to adjust the
procedural rules that control civil rights actions"); Stephen J. Shapiro, Public Officials' Qualified
Immunity in Section 1983 Actions Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald and Its Progeny: A Critical
Analysis, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249,253-54 (1989) (arguing that procedural unfairness of
qualified immunity defense requires statutory reform for civil rights actions).
3. 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHTETAL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914.10
n.92 (Supp. 1997) (stating that during three-year study of interlocutory appeals, appellate courts
reversed district court orders denying official immunity in more than 70% of cases).
4. See infratext accompanying notes 138-74, 183-241 for discussion of these interlocu-
tory appeals.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 138-70, 183-85, 187-234 for discussion of these
interlocutory appeals.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 9, 179-85, 220-21, 235-41. To illustrate, under
Johnson v. Jones, appellate courts do not have jurisdiction during an interlocutory appeal to
consider whether the district court properly determined that the material facts were in dispute.
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson,
appellate courts have nevertheless assertedjurisdiction over thatvery issue. See Turner v. Scott,
119 F.3d 425, 427 (6th Cir. 1997). The issue in Turner was whether the-defendant, a police
officer, had known of another officer's abusive behavior in hitting the plaintiff with a gun. Id.
The district court decided that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence for the issue to go
to thejury. Id. The Sixth Circuit granted qualified immunity, stating that "there is not a scintilla
of evidence linking Officer Scott to the harm." Id. at 430; see also Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d
640, 642-44 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2512 (1997). In Elliott, police officers
arrested the plaintiff-decedent for driving while intoxicated. Id. at 641. They handcuffed him
and put him in their cruiser. Id. The officers contended that their 22 shots at the plaintiff-
decedent were justified because he appeared to point a gun at him, even though they had just
finished searching him. Id. at 642. With the suspect now dead, the only surviving witnesses
were the police officers. The district court denied summaryjudgment because material facts were
in dispute. Id. at 644. Despite Johnson, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "As to the
material facts here, there is no genuine dispute because the plaintiff has come forward with no
evidence." Id. Ruling on the merits, the Fourth Circuit determined that the plaintiff had failed
to prove a constitutional violation. Id.
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Procedure7 and ignoring institutional restraints.' Appellate courts have robbed
Some courts have also erroneously assertedjurisdiction to decide whether the plaintiff has
stated a claim even if such a review requires sifting and weighing the facts the district court found
sufficiently supported. See Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151,154 (6th Cir. 1995). In Sanderfer,
a prisoner alleged that prison officials were "deliberately indifferent" to her serious medical needs,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. The district court ruled that she had demonstrated
sufficient evidence to create a material fact as to whether the officials were deliberately
indifferent. Id. The Sixth Circuit asserted jurisdiction and held that in viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff had established at most negligence, not
deliberate indifference. Id. at 155. The appellate court thus considered the sufficiency of the
evidence, yet explained that it could do so because it was determining the question of whether
the plaintiff had stated a constitutional violation. 1d. at 153 n.2; see also Edwards v. Giles, 51
F.3d 155 (8th Cir. 1995). In Edwards, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals evaluated the
sufficiency of the evidence in a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
It held that the plaintiff's affidavit alleging that police officers used excessive force did not
provide enough detail as to how the force was unreasonable. Id. at 157. The plaintiffhad alleged
that during the arrest he was not belligerent and that the officers had unreasonably thrown him
to the ground, injuring him. Id. In contrast, the district court had found material facts in dispute
and denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Id. at 156.
In addition, some courts have unnecessarily expanded their jurisdiction in qualified
immunity appeals by reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence question by using the doctrine
of pendent appellate jurisdiction. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 143-58 for a discussion of how appellate courts
have ignored procedural limitations. To illustrate, some courts have granted qualified immunity
on summary judgment by erroneously deciding disputed material facts, in violation of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) (stating that summary judgment is proper if material facts are not
in dispute and party is entitled to judgment as matter of law). See, e.g., Lennon v. Miller, 66
F.3d 416, 422 (2d Cir. 1995). In Lennon, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals declared that
there were no material facts in dispute and granted qualified immunity to a police officer who
had allegedly used unreasonable force in "yank[ing]" a suspect out of a car. Id at 426. Either
the court decided that the yank was not too forceful, a factual issue, or it created a per se right
for officers to use whatever force is necessary to get a citizen out of a car. Wilson v. Meeks, 52
F.3d 1547, 1556 (10th Cir. 1995). In Wilson, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals resolved
disputed material facts in order to grant a police officer qualified immunity for his failure to
prevent the plaintiff's death. Id. The plaintiff was a suspect, who died either of positional
asphyxiation by lying on his stomach with his wrists secured in handcuffs orby suffocation from
the "inspiration of blood, dirt, and vomit." Id. at 1550. The plaintiff-decedent alleged that police
officers were deliberately indifferentto his serious medical needs. Id. at 1549. The district court
ruled that there were disputed issues of material facts that made deciding the immunity question
impossible. ld. An officer had refused to take off the handcuffs when requested to do so by a
medical technician because the suspect was too bloody. Id. at 1550. The appellate court held
that the refusal did not evidence deliberate indifference and granted qualified immunity to the
arresting officers. Id. at 1556; see also Gooden v. Howard County, 954 F.2d 960, 965 (4th Cir.
1992) (en banc). In Gooden, a majority of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals erroneously
granted qualified immunity for officials for an unlawful arrest on summaryjudgmentby resolving
material disputed facts. Id. at 964. Although the facts are detailed, the heart of the conflict
centered on whether police officers reasonably believed that the plaintiff was a danger to herself
and should be arrested. Id. at 963-64. They had heard hollering in one of the apartments and
investigated. Id. at 962-63. The plaintiff responded to their inquiries by stating that she had
been ironing clothes and burned herself. Id. According to the plaintiff, she showed the officers
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constitutionally injured citizens of their day in court by granting motions for
dismissal9 and summaryjudgment ° when the appellate courts lackjurisdiction.
the hot iron, clothes, and the bum mark. Id. at 963. In direct contrast, the officers stated that
the iron was cold and that there were no clothes or bum mark. Id. at 962-63. When they left
they heard more shouting by a male and a female, but not in response to each other. Id. at 963.
Assuming that the plaintiff had multiple personalities, they arrested her. Id. at 963-64. The
plaintiff argued that she told them that she had been on the telephone talking. Id. at 963. The
Fourth Circuit clearly believed the officers' version of what happened. Id. at 965-66.
Courts have also imposed a heightened pleading standard for civil rights plaintiffs, in
violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). See F.R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (stating that
plaintiff need only provide "short and plain statement of the claim"); see also Crawford-El v.
Britton, 93 F.3d 813 (D.C. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2451 (1997) (reviewing
whether District Court for the District of Columbia properly interpreted the qualified immunity
defense as requiring plaintiff to meet a "clear and convincing" evidence standard for First
Amendment claim raising unconstitutional intent). See, e.g., IAMARTINF. ScHwARTz&JOHN
E.KRKLIN, SECTIoN 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMSANDDEFENSES § 1.6, at 19 (3ded. 1997) (stating
that courts of appeals have all required plaintiffs to plead "specific factual allegations demon-
strating a deprivation of federal rights under color of state law").
One court has also by judicial interpretation "amended" Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
7(a) by suggesting that district courts must order plaintiffs to issue a reply to an official's answer
when the answer raises the qualified immunity defense. See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427,
1434 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (stating that "vindicating the immunity doctrine will ordinarily
require such a reply, and district court's discretion not to do so is narrow indeed when greater
detail might assist"); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a) (stating that court has discretion to "order a
reply to an answer").
8. The Supreme Court has specifically and erroneously authorized appellate courts to
"find" facts when officials appeal from an order denying summaryjudgment in which the district
court failed to specify the material disputed facts. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 842
(1996); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319 (1995). For a discussion of the appellate courts'
proper role during appeals from these orders, see infra p. 44.
In response to Behrens and Johnson, many appellate courts have run wild with the new
freedom to canvass the record. Some have "supplemented" the district court's articulated,
assumed facts. See, e.g., Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (1 th Cir. 1996) (stating that
"we will begin with the facts found by the district court and supplement them only where
necessary to determine if summaryjudgment should have been granted after proper application
of the law to the facts"). Some have found "discretion" to accept the district court's assumed
facts. See, e.g., McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554, 1563 (11th Cir.), amended by 101 F.3d
1363 (1 1th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2514 (1997). And some, in clear violation of
Johnson, have explicitly rejected the district court's assumed facts, determining that the district
court improperly evaluated the evidence. See, e.g., Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151, 155 (6th
Cir. 1995).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 183-86 for discussion of why jurisdiction does not
exist for these interlocutory appeals. During interlocutory appeals frommotions to dismiss, some
courts determine that the plaintiff has not stated claim and dismiss the lawsuit. See, e.g., Doe
v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412, 1414 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that
plaintiffwho had allegedly been raped by school custodian did not state constitutional violation).
Some appellate courts dismiss suits because the complaint did not state a violation of clearly
established law. See, e.g., Williams v. Alabama State Univ., 102 F.3d 1179, 1183 n.4 (1 lth Cir.
1997) (plaintiff's alleged First Amendment rights were not clearly established); Foster v. City
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The appellate courts have misread the qualified immunity standard articu-
lated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald" as granting appellate courts the power to change
procedural rules and expand theirjurisdiction. 2 In Harlow, the Supreme Court
rewrote the qualified immunity standard to eliminate meritless suits as soon
as procedurally possible. 3 To further this purpose, Harlow created an objective
reasonableness standard for qualified immunity, one that no longer considered
whether officials acted maliciously. 4 Harlow discarded malice as a question
because it raised a factual issue not capable of resolution in a motion for
summary judgment. 5 Under the new qualified immunity standard, officials
had immunity if they acted in accordance with a standard of objective reason-
ableness. 6 Courts were to determine objective reasonableness by examining
case law and considering whether the law was clearly established. 7 If officials
violated clearly established law, then they would not have immunity; if they
did not, they would have immunity. Harlow also stated that discovery should
not be allowed until a court determines on summaryjudgment whether the law
was "clearly established at the time [the challenged] action occurred."'
19
of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 427 (5th Cir. 1994). In Foster, the plaintiffs alleged that city
officials had conspired to deny them their right to access to courts by "concealing andsuppressing
evidence" during the discovery phase of an automobile accident case that they later settled. Id.
The Fifth Circuit granted the city officials motion to dismiss, holding that the officials' had
qualified immunity. Id. at 431. Some appellate courts state that jurisdiction lies to consider
either, whether the plaintiff has stated a claim and whether the law was clearly established. See,
e.g., Vaughn v. United States Small Bus. Admin., 82 F.3d 684, 685 (6th Cir. 1996).
In addition to motions for dismissal for failure to state a claim or for failure to allege a
violation of clearly established law, some courts have also mistakenly asserted jurisdiction from
orders denying qualified immunity in a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See, e.g., Somers
v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 616 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding jurisdiction for motion for
judgment on pleadings to grant officials qualified immunity because female prison guards' alleged
conduct during body cavity search and showering of male plaintiff did not violate clearly
established law); Prater v. Dahm, 89 F.3d 538, 540 (8th Cir. 1996) (findingjurisdiction to grant
officials' motion for judgment on pleadings where prisoner alleged that officials had failed to
protect him from inmate they knew to be dangerous).
10. See infra Part V.B.2.
11. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
12. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982). For a discussion of Harlow, see
infra text accompanying notes 56-69.
13. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816-18.
14. Id. at 815-18.
15. Id. at 816.
16. ld. at 818.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 818-19.
19. Id. at 818. Later inAnderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987), the Court
stated that discovery tailored to the qualified immunity issue would be possible in some circum-
stances. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
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In response to this standard, the appellate courts interpreted Harlow as
creating procedural freedoms capable of protection on appeal.2" The qualified
immunity standard now had two prongs: a defense-to-liability prong and an
immunity-from-suit prong.2' The defense-to-liability prong freed officials from
having to pay damages if they did not violate clearly established rights. 2 In
contrast, the immunity-from-suit prong gave officials procedural freedom from
participating in unnecessary discovery or trials.'
FollowingHarlow, asignificantproblem emerged: When would appellate
courts havejurisdiction to immediately review pretrial orders denying qualified
immunity? Traditionally, federal appellate jurisdiction arises from the final
judgment statute, which provides that "courts ofappeals... shall havejurisdic-
tion of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United
States."24 Yet, when officials assert qualified immunity, the right to an
immediate appeal nevertheless derives from this statute,' not from the civil
rights statute allowing constitutional tort lawsuits against state officials, 42
U.S.C. § 1983,26 nor from the United States Constitution, the source for actions
against federal officials.27
Even though the explicit language of the final judgment statute requires
"final decisions," the Court has declared that some interlocutory appeals under
this jurisdictional statute are nevertheless "final" because of the judicially
created "collateral order doctrine."28 Under this doctrine, nonfinal orders are
appealable if they fall within "that small class"29 of orders that "[1] conclu-
20. See infra text accompanying notes 83-174.
21. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-26 (1985) (plurality opinion).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 56-58.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 63-76.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
25. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530. Becausethe right to an interlocutory appeal is aprocedural
right, state courts hearing constitutional tort lawsuits are free to follow their own interlocutory
rules. Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1800, 1805-06 (1997). Thus, when citizens sue officials
in state courts that do not provide for interlocutory appeals, qualified immunity is only a defense
to liability.
26. But see Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525 (suggesting that this "immunity from suit" came
qualified immunity defense itself, not § 1291, final judgment statute). The Mitchell decision
interpreted the "clearly established" law standard articulated Harlow as recognizing "an entitle-
ment not to stand trial under certain circumstances." Id.
27. Constitutional tort actions against federal officials are known as Bivens actions because
of the case that first recognized these lawsuits, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See generally ERWIN CHEMiERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDIcTION § 9.1, at 452-70 (1st ed. 1989) (discussing Bivens and its progeny).
28. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
29. Id. (quoted with approval in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,524 (1985) (plurality
opinion)).
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sively determine [a] disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue com-
pletely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] [are] effectively unre-
viewable on appeal from a final judgment.
30
In 1985, the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Forsyth1 interpreted the
qualified immunity defense under these three jurisdictional requirements of
the collateral order doctrine.32 A plurality of the Mitchell Court determined
that an interlocutory appeal would protect officials' immunity-from-suit.33 On
appeal, a court could consider whether the law was clearly established before
allowing discovery or a trial to proceed. Ifthe law was not clearly established,
then the official had qualified immunity and thus was not subject either to
discovery or a trial.
Since Mitchell, appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, have
discerned few jurisdictional limits.34 Not until ten years after recognizing the
right to an interlocutory appeal in Mitchell did the Court in Johnson v. Jones"
properly articulate its first jurisdictional limitation.36 In Johnson, the Court
30. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304,310 (1995) (numbering ofelementsbyJohnson Court)
(quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct & SewerAuth. v. Metcalf& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,144 (1993)
(bracketednumbersinoriginal)(quotingCoopers&Lybrandv.Livesay,437U.S.463,468(1978)).
31. 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (plurality opinion).
32. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (plurality opinion). The number ofelements
in the collateral order doctrine is unclear. In the seminal decision creating this doctrine, Cohen
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., the Court also stated that the order should raise a "serious and
unsettled question." Cohen, 337 U.S. at 547. The Court later specified this as "an additional
requirement." Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,742 (1982). Sometimes scholars combine this
"additional consideration" with the language requiring the issue to be "important" as creating
a distinct fourth factor. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Hanslick, Comment, Decisions Denying the
Appointment of Counsel and the Final Judgment Rule in Civil Rights Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L.
REV. 782, 795 (1992) ("Fourth and finally," under original Cohen doctrine the order must raise
an important, unsettled issue). Some scholars have argued that the Supreme Court has abandoned
this issue. See, e.g., id. Even if the issue need not be "unsettled" for the collateral order doctrine
to apply, in the context of qualified immunity interlocutory appeals, one can assume that the
defense itself raises an important issue, even though the Court has not explicitly discussed
"importance" as a distinct fourth factor. See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. This
article assumes the right to be free from unnecessary discovery and trials is one that generally
raises an important issue within the meaning of the collateral order doctrine. One can also note
the Court's own numbering- it delineated three. See Puerto RicoAqueduct & SewerAuth., 506
U.S. at 144; see also Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 866 (1994)
(referring to "three-pronged test for determining when 'collateral order' appeal is allowed");
Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 498 (1989) ("order must satisfy at least three
conditions" derived from Cohen). But see Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 844 (1996)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that "interest being asserted must be an important one").
33. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-27.
34. See supra note 9; infra text accompanying notes 184-85.
35. 515 U.S. 304 (1995).
36. Johhson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 315-18 (1995).
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held that no jurisdiction existed for appeals from district court orders denying
summary judgment because of disputes as to material facts."7 However, the
very next year, in Behrens v. Pelletier," the Court drastically narrowed the
limitation articulated in Johnson.39 Such appeals would now lie if district
courts also ruled that the law was clearly established."
The purpose of this Article is to define when, under the collateral order
doctrine, appellate courts have jurisdiction from interlocutory orders in cases
that raise qualified immunity as a defense. Articulating the scope of appellate
jurisdiction is important because appellate courts are overprotecting govern-
mental officials and underprotecting constitutionally injured plaintiffs.
The judicially created qualified immunity defense balances conflicting
interests. The defense-to-liability prong allows officials to act decisively,
knowing liability for their actions arises only if they violated clearly established
law. The immunity-from-suit prong protects society's and the officials'
interests in not having to spend time defending meritless lawsuits. Opposing
these interests is society's and a constitutionally injured plaintiffs interest in
seeking redress for violations of clearly established law. Many appellate courts
have failed to discern how interlocutory appeals can disrupt this delicate
balance. In some circumstances, appellate courts have erroneously decided
factual issues for thejury, imposed heightened pleading burdens, and afforded
governmental officials the opportunity to create unnecessary delay.
To safeguard the balance of interests struck by qualified immunity, this
Article also details an important limit on the erroneous assertion of appellate
jurisdiction: the doctrine of frivolity,41 which allows both appellate courts and
district courts to simultaneously possessjurisdiction. This radical construction
ofjurisdiction is necessary to avoid meritless delays and allow civil rights cases
to proceed to trial.
Part II of this Article reveals that qualified immunity as a defense exists
solely by judicial creation and interpretation.42 Part II examines the creation
of the Harlow standard for qualified immunity and describes the defense-to-
liability prong - whether the law was clearly established, the central issue of
37. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319-20. Foradiscussion ofthis case, see infratextaccompanying
notes 90-107, 221, 240-41.
38. 116 S. Ct. 834 (1996).
39. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 842 (1996).
40. Id. For a discussion of Behrens, see infra text accompanying notes 104-41, 192-99,
240-41.
41. Foradiscussion ofthe doctrine offrivolity, see infra text accompanying notes 254-58.
42. See Achtenberg, supra note 1, at 499 (stating that Supreme Court has used at least five
different approaches for determining when qualified immunity is available and not one is con-
sistent with Congress's intent); infra Part II (indicating judicial creation of qualified immunity
defense).
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interlocutory appeals.43
Parts III and IV focus on the Supreme Court's decisions on the collateral
order doctrine as applied to the qualified immunity defense." Part III discusses
the Court's expansive view of appellate jurisdiction." Part IV focuses on the
Supreme Court's misguided view of pretrial motions in these interlocutory
appeals, particularly motions for dismissal and for summary judgment. 6
Part V provides a different perspective of interlocutory appeals by finding
limits arising from the collateral order doctrine, the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, and institutional expertise. It applies this different perspective to six
different orders denying qualified immunity: (1) orders for dismissal; (2) orders
for summary judgment before discovery; (3) orders denying protection from
discovery; (4) orders for summary judgment after discovery; (5) orders denying
qualified immunity because the defendant was a private person, not an official
able to assert immunity; and (6) orders denying qualified immunity that are
later declared by the district court to be frivolous.47 This section argues, contrary
to both Mitchell and Behrens, that there is no appellate jurisdiction from an
order refusing to dismiss based on qualified immunity. Instead, jurisdiction
lies from motions for summary judgment, both before and after discovery, in
some circumstances. It emphasizes that traditional summary judgment rules
apply to these interlocutory appeals. Appellate courts should not invade the
province of the district courts and juries by creating their own factual assump-
tions when district courts deny summary judgment because material facts are
disputed. It also indicates ajurisdictional line for appeals from orders denying
protection from discovery: jurisdiction lies if the district court postponed
deciding whether the law was clearly established until discovery concluded,
butjurisdiction does not exist if the district court merely determined that discov-
ery was not overly broad. In addition to appellate jurisdiction for these orders,
jurisdiction also lies when a district court determines in a motion for summary
judgment before discovery that the defendant is a private person. This type
of order is reviewable on an interlocutory appeal because it bars defendants
from later raising qualified immunity, except on appeal from a final judgment.
Part V also discusses an important check on these orders - the doctrine
of dual jurisdiction for appeals from frivolous orders.48 In some circumstances,
both the district court and appellate court have jurisdiction: The district court
issues an order declaring the appeal to be frivolous and continues its proceed-
43. See infra Part II (discussing standard for qualified immunity defense and defense-to-
liability prong).
44. See infra Parts III-IV (discussing collateral order doctrine decisions).
45. See infra Part III (discussing Court's view of appellate jurisdiction).
46. See infra Part lV (discussing Court's view of pretrial motions in interlocutory appeals).
47. See infra Part V (discussing orders denying qualified immunity).
48. See infra Part V (discussing doctrine of dual jurisdiction).
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ings, and the appellate court simultaneously addresses the qualified immunity
question. This strange jurisdictional creature properly bars officials from
taking frivolous appeals. Frivolous appeals simply do not protect the interests
safeguarded in Harlow's immunity-from-suit prong.
The Article concludes by reflecting on how appellate courts properly
protectthe balance struck by the defense of qualified immunity by recognizing
their limited, but important, role on interlocutory appeals.49
II. The Immunity-from-Suit Prong Implied in the Harlow
Standard of Qualified Immunity
The qualified immunity defense exists solely by judicial interpretation
of Congress's intent." It applies to both state and federal officials,5 even
though the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states that "[e]very person.., shall be
liable" for constitutional violations 2 and even though Congress has not passed
a statute applying this defense to federal officials. The qualified immunity
defense for these officials is the result of the Court's ascertaining Congress's
intent in passing § 1983 in 1871 and its silence in permitting constitutional tort
actions against federal officials.
Ascertaining Congress's intent in this area has been difficult for the
Supreme Court.53 At one point, the Court stated that qualified immunity was
dependent upon the "scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office."54
49. See infra Part VI (concluding on proper balance for qualified immunity)
50. See supra note 1 (listing articles on effect of judicial interpretation on qualified
immunity).
51. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 n.30 (1982) (stating that it would be
"untenableto draw adistinction forpurposes of immunity lawbetween suits brought against state
officialsunder § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials"
(quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978))).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). This statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Id.
53. See supra note I (listing articles on effect of judicial interpretation on qualified
immunity); see also Achtenberg, supra note 1, at 535. Professor Achtenberg states that:
Congress did not intend to resolve immunity issues itself, but rather intended to
permit the Court to resolve those issues on a case-by-case basis. On the other hand,
Congress did not intend to give the Supreme Court unfettered discretion to create
immunities based on the Justices' own views of sound public policy.
Id.
54. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974).
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It also stated that officials lose their qualified immunity by acting in two ways:
violating undisputed law or acting maliciously.5
In 1982, however, the Harlow Court revised the qualified immunity stan-
dard without an exegesis as to what Congress must have intended. 6 The Court
jettisoned the malicious component of the qualified immunity defense. It
retained, however, the other component - whether the official violated undis-
puted law. This component became the "clearly established" law standard of
Harlow. In 1987, the Court in Anderson v. Creighton7 discarded linking the
scope of the immunity with the level of responsibility. Instead, it found that
qualified immunity applies to all officials performing "discretionary" tasks.59
The Harlow Court rejected the malice component on pure policy grounds.
It declared that such a factual question was eating away at the time officials
had to perform their duties, harming both society and the decision making
power ofofficials. WithHarlow, procedures suddenly becamevery important.
In 1982, however, the Harlow Court had not yet experienced the effects
of its own 1986 summary judgment make-over of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 that occurred in a trilogy of cases: Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio,6 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. ,61 and Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett.62 The new view of summary judgment allowed courts to dispose of
cases in ways that they could not before. A state-of-mind issue was not always
a bar to summary judgment. 3 In some cases, the nonmovant would have to
provide stronger evidence to oppose summary judgment,' and the movant
could point to the absence of factual support for the nonmovant's claim6 5
Instead of reinterpreting the law of summary judgment as it did in 1986, the
Harlow Court simply declared that the qualified immunity defense could be
55. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). In Wood, the Supreme Court held
that a
school board member is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if he
knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of
official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights ofthe student affected,
or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury to the student.
Id.
56. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982).
57. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
58. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
59. Id. at 638, 642-43.
60. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
61. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
62. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
63. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986).
64. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986).
65. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
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resolved before discovery and on summary judgment.
TheHarlow Court made four procedural observations. First, courts should
not grant discovery until they have decided whether the law was "clearly estab-
lished" at the time the officials acted.' Second, discovery as to whether offi-
cials knewthattheywereviolating acitizen's constitutional rights can be broad
ranging andtremendously disruptive.67 Third, plaintiffs can easily allege malice
and force atrial because, under prior summary judgment law, a single sentence
written in casual correspondence was sufficient to create a triable issue of
malice.6" Fourth, discovery can create thorny separation-of-powers issues.69
The Court used these procedural observations to explain why a qualified
immunity standard built on "objective reasonableness" was better than the prior
malice test. It implied that application ofthe qualified immunity defense before
discovery was an easy task because the clarity of the law determined whether
the official acted reasonably. If the law was clear, there was no immunity; if
the law was unclear, there was immunity. The Court labeled this standard as
"objective" because it measured reasonableness solely through case law, not
the inside of the official's head. Objective reasonableness thus became linked
with the issue of notice: If the law was clear, the official should have known
better; if the law was unclear, the official probably did not know any better.
Five years later inAnderson v. Creighton, the Supreme Court elaborated
on what constituted sufficient notice and, in a footnote, reinterpreted Harlow
to allow discovery in some qualified immunity cases.70 In doing so, the Court
discussed both aspects of the qualified immunity defense, the defense to
liability and the "immunity from suit."71
With respectto qualified immunity as a defense to liability, the Anderson
Court indicated that the language of the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits
"unreasonable searches and seizures," does not automatically put officials on
notice for purposes of the qualified immunity defense.72 An official can act
unreasonably under the Fourth Amendment, but act reasonably under the
Harlow standard. The key to distinguishing between these dual standards of
reasonableness, according to the Anderson Court, was to interpret the Harlow
qualified immunity standard as requiring more notice than the Fourth Amend
ment itself.73 UnderAnderson, qualified-immunity reasonableness focuses on
66. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
67. Id. at 817-18.
68. Id. at 817 n.29.
69. Id. at 817 n.28.
70. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40, 646 n.6 (1987).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 643.
73. Id.
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 3 (1998)
whetherthe "contours"'74 of a constitutional right were sufficiently clear to put
officials on notice that their actions were unlawful.
Although no one really knows what constitutes a "contour" of a constitu-
tional right, the Harlow standard, as explained byAnderson, indicates that case
law is what puts officials on notice. For example, under the Fourth Amend-
ment, the clarity of the law is not measured by current police practices in the
United States, but rather by reported decisional law. Case law interpreting
constitutional rights provides officials with notice.
Although this explanation of the Harlow standard made it easier for
officials to successfully assert qualified immunity as a defense to liability, the
Court appropriately recognized that with respect to the procedural aspect of
the defense - the "immunity from suit" - there were some limitations. In a
footnote, where the Court frequently buries significant statements, theAnderson
Court stated that the district court would have to decide whether discovery
should be granted before it decides the summaryjudgment motion for qualified
immunity.75 This statement sharply contrasted with Harlow's simple statement
that the defense of qualified immunity question could be resolved without
discovery on a motion for summary judgment.76
After Anderson, the Harlow defense-of-liability prong became more
protective of governmental officials and the "immunity of suit" prong had an
important gloss. The first prong required courts to more narrowly interpret
what constitutes "clearly established" law. The second prong, afterAnderson,
permitted discovery in some circumstances. The difficulty is determining what
circumstances create a need for discovery.
Anderson's statement on discovery can also raise an important jurisdic-
tional question for interlocutory appeals. Do appellate courts havejurisdiction
to hear qualified immunity motions when discovery is necessary in the case
under consideration?77 An examination of Mitchell and its progeny reveals how
the Court viewsjurisdiction over appeals from orders rendered before and after
discovery.
III. The Collateral Order Doctrine: Enlarging Appellate Jurisdiction
Examining the Supreme Court's decisions discussing jurisdiction for
interlocutory appeals from orders denying qualified immunity is like looking
at a partly completed jigsaw puzzle on a table. Both have a few pieces that are
not yet connected to each other. With just four decisions, Johnson v. Fankell,8
74. Id. at 640.
75. Id. at 646 n.6.
76. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
77. For a resolution of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 208-09, 220-35.
78. 117 S. Ct. 1800 (1997).
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Mitchell v. Forsyth, Johnson v. Jones, and Behrens v. Pelletier,79 a coherent
framework for jurisdictional and procedural analysis is lacking."
In its clearest statement ofjurisdiction, the Fankell Court indicated that
the right to an interlocutory appeal from an order denying qualified immunity
is a procedural right arising from the final judgment statute.8 1 It is not a
substantive right created byHarlow. Jurisdiction for such appeals, thus, comes
from complying with the Court's collateral order doctrine,82 ajudicially created
exception to the final-judgment statute.
Mitchell v. Forsyth and its progeny indicate that some, not all, orders
denying qualified immunity meet the three elements of the collateral order
doctrine: (1) the issue can be conclusively resolved on appeal, (2) it is an
important issue separate from the merits of the case, and (3) it is unreviewable
from a final judgment. 3 In Mitchell, Johnson, and Behrens, officials filed
interlocutory appeals from orders denying qualified immunity in a motion for
summary judgment after discovery. In Mitchell and Behrens, jurisdiction was
present." In Johnson, there was nojurisdiction because the order failed to meet
the second element, separability. Discerning jurisdiction is not as simple as
looking at the type of procedural motion before a court. What matters is the
issue that the court is asked to consider.
In Mitchell, a plurality of the Court found jurisdiction because the issue
on appeal was whether the law was clearly established. In examining the first
element, complete resolution, the plurality stated that this issue was one that
could be finally resolved in a "motion for dismissal or summary judgment."'8
Second, the Mitchell plurality determined that the "claim of immunity is
conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiffs claim."8" It viewed the
procedural posture of interlocutory appeals as shielding appellate courts from
having to resolve the merits. The Mitchell plurality stated that appellate courts
would not need to evaluate the "correctness of the plaintiff's version of the
facts, nor even determine whether the plaintiffs allegations actually state a
79. 116 S. Ct. 834 (1996).
80. See generally Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1800 (1997) (discussing qualified
immunity); Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct..834, 838-47 (1996) (same); Johnson v. Jones, 515
U.S. 304, 309-15 (1995) (same); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-30 (1985) (plurality
opinion) (same).
81. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. at 1806.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 28-32.
84. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530.
85. Behrens, 116 S. Ct. at 842; Johnson, 515 U.S. at 316-17.
86. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985) (plurality opinion).
87. Id. at 527-28.
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claim.""8 They would simply address a separate, resolvable issue - whether
the law was clearly established when the official acted. Finally, it added that
the right to be free from unnecessary discovery and trials would be unreview-
able if officials had to wait to appeal from a final judgment.8 9
Ten years later, the Johnson Court found jurisdiction lacking because the
issue on interlocutory appeal was whether the plaintiff had offered sufficient
evidence for ajury to determine that officials had violated his constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable force.9" (Later, the Behrens Court would
interpret the Johnson record as not raising the question whether the law was
clearly established.9 Presumably, ifthejury had believed the injured citizen's
version of what happened, then the officials would have violated clearly
established law and would not be entitled to qualified immunity. If it had
believed the officials, however, then there was no constitutional violation.)92
The Johnson Court determined that the issue raised on appeal was not
separate from the merits of the underlying case.93 It recognized that there was
a difference between entitlement to an interlocutory appeal and an entitle-
ment to summary judgment.9' It explained that Mitchell, when "read in
context,"95 provided that an official was entitled to summary judgment when
"discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue."96
The right to an interlocutory appeal, in contrast, was dependent upon pre-
senting the appellate court with a legal issue that did not require it to
"consider the correctness of the plaintiff's version of facts." '97 Thus, determin-
ing the sufficiency of evidence on appeal is an impermissible review for
"correctness."
The Johnson Court also made three important observations about the
collateral order doctrine. First, it stated that appealability of orders is deter-
mined by category, not by balancing the interests of the parties in a specific
case.98 The place for making policy judgments about appealability was in
88. Id. at 528.
89. Id. at 527.
90. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995).
91. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 842 (1996).
92. Although the Supreme Court did not discuss this interpretation of the record, it was
the officials' position before the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Jones v. Johnson,
26 F.3d 727, 728 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that "[d]efendants do not deny that if they beat the
plaintiff, as he believes they did, then they lack immunity"), affd inpart, 515 U.S. 304 (1995).
93. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 314.
94. Id. at313-14.
95. Id.
96. Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
97. Id. at 312 (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528).
98. Id. at315.
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delineating specific categories, not in case-by-case adjudication. Categorical
distinctions prevent appellate courts from having to assess the need for review
whenever an official seeks an interlocutory appeal. In short, the issue raised
on appeal would have to be categorically important within the meaning of the
collateral order doctrine to warrant an appeal. Second, the Johnson Court
recognized that in relying appropriately on the expertise of district courts,
appellate courts could further the "wise use of appellate resources."99 It
suggested that appellate courts would probably not invoke the doctrine of
pendent appellate jurisdiction to review sufficiency of evidence claims."
Third, the Court suggested that appellate courts may have jurisdiction to
decide whether the law was clearly established, even when district courts do
not indicate the facts they assumed in denying summary judgment motions
asserting qualified immunity."0 ' In such situations, the appellate courts "may
have to" 02 review the record to ascertain the facts that the district court
assumed in denying the summary judgment motion based on qualified immu-
nity. In doing so, the appellate court does not weigh the evidence. The purpose
of this "cumbersome"'0 3 review is to use the ascertained "assumed facts" and
99. Id. at 317.
100. Id. at 3 18. Under the doctrine ofpendent appellatejurisdiction, an appellate court has
discretion to review an issue over which it does not have jurisdiction if the issue is intertwined
with one issue over which it does have jurisdiction. See, e.g., Swint v. Chambers County
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 51 (1995) (stating that no pendent appellatejurisdiction would lie from
order denying summary judgment for county because it did not raise issue "inextricably
intertwined with" the officials' qualified immunity motion). See generally Riyaz A. Kanji, The
Proper Scope ofPendentAppellate Jurisdiction in the Collateral Order Context, 100 YALE L.J.
511,511 (1990) (contendingthat "thecollateral order doctrine supports only anarrow extension
ofappellatejurisdictionto pendent issues"). Butsee generally Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636,
1651 n.41 (1997) (stating that pendent appellatejurisdiction allowed appellate court to evaluate
district court's staying the sexual harassment trial of President Clinton because this issue was
sufficiently intertwined with district court's refusal to stay discovery, ironically extending
jurisdiction to issue of which official did not seek review).
As applied to qualified immunity appeals, the Johnson Court implied that even if the
appellate court has jurisdiction over whether the law was clearly established, it would not
necessarily review sufficiency of evidence claims by invoking pendent appellate jurisdiction.
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304,318 (1995). Some courts, however, have nevertheless invoked
pendent appellatejurisdiction to address the sufficiency of evidence issue. See, e.g., McMillian
v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554, 1563 (11th Cir.), amended by 101 F.3d 1363 (1 lth Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 2514 (1997).
101. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1995).
102. Id at 319. Whether the Supreme Court requires appellate courts to review records to
ascertain the district court's "assumed" facts is a question of semantics. In Behrens v. Pelletier,
the Court quoted Johnson's language that courts "may have to" do so. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116
S. Ct. 834, 842 (1996) "May have to" falls short of the word "must." For a discussion of
institutional limits in bar this kind of review, see infra text accompanying notes 236-41.
103. Johnson, 515 U.S. at319.
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ask the separable question, was the law clearly established. Determining the
clarity of the law is one question that an appellate court has jurisdiction over
in light of Mitchell.
With the separability element as an important jurisdictional limit in
Johnson, the Behrens Court, the very next year, found two ways to significantly
expand appellate jurisdiction."° First, it narrowly interpreted Johnson as
stating that appeals sometimes could lie from summary judgment orders
denying qualified immunity when material facts are in dispute. 5 Second, it
determined that sometimes officials may take more than one interlocutory
appeal.' O6 It also erroneously suggested that interlocutory appeals would lie
from motions to dismiss based on qualified immunity.0 7
In Behrens, after discovery had concluded, the district court determined
that material facts were in dispute and denied the official's motion for summary
judgment.0 8 The official took an interlocutory appeal, and the district court
issued an order stating that the appeal was frivolous.'09 The court of appeals
denied jurisdiction, stating that because the official had previously had an
interlocutory appeal from his motion to dismiss no appeal would lie."0 With
this as the procedural posture of the case, the Behrens Court revisited the
Johnson Court's view of separability."' Specifically, Behrens considered
whether the district court's determination of material disputed facts bars
appellate jurisdiction." 2 It also had to address explicitly whether more than
one interlocutory appeal would lie under the collateral order doctrine.
In analyzing jurisdiction when material facts are disputed, the Court made
an unusually broad statement about summary judgment on interlocutory
appeals: "Denial of summary judgment often includes a determination that
there are controverted issues of material fact, ... and [Johnson] surely does
not mean that every such denial of summary judgment is nonappealable."13
Although the Court's broad statement ignores other reasons courts may deny
summary judgment, such as untimely motions, it expressly narrowed the
Johnson Court's limitation on interlocutory appeals. It did so by stating that
just because a district court order indicates that material facts are in dispute
does not mean than an interlocutory appeal is per se barred.
104. See Behrens, 116 S. Ct. at 840-42.
105. Id. at 842.
106. Id. at 840-41.
107. Id. at 840.






INTERLOCUTORYAPPEALS AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 21
The Behrens Court asserted that appellate courts can, nevertheless, have
jurisdiction if the district court's order decided not only that material facts are
in dispute, but also that the law was clearly established." 4 Such orders raise
two issues. After Johnson, the appellate court has no jurisdiction to decide the
first issue, the sufficiency of the evidence. However, in light of Mitchell, the
court has jurisdiction to hear the second issue, the clarity of the law.
The Behrens Court implied that appeals from orders with disputed facts
invoke a review process similar to that for orders with undisputed facts. First,
the appellate court reads the district court's order, which either indicates the
undisputed facts or the facts it assumed to be in dispute-"' Second, the appel-
late court looks at case law and asks whether the law was clearly established
with respect to the official conduct, as specified in the undisputed facts or in
the "assumed" facts.1 6 Ifthe law was clear, then the official has no immunity,
whether the official's actions were based on undisputed facts or upon the
district court's "assumed facts." In the event that the district court did not
specify the facts it assumed, an appellate court, under both Behrens and
Johnson, reviews the record to determine what material facts the district court
assumed to be in dispute.'17
In addition to narrowing the Johnson decision, the Behrens Court ex-
panded jurisdiction by allowing multiple appeals. In doing so, it did not limit
its holding to the unusual facts of the case, nor did it provide a detailed analysis
of the three elements of the collateral order doctrine - final resolution, separa-
bility, and unreviewability. Although these three elements were implicit in the
Court's discussion, what was pronounced was the "importance"" 8 aspect of
the collateral order doctrine, which some commentators have labeled as a fourth
element of the doctrine." 9 In addition to discussing the importance of the
qualified immunity defense, the Court broadly spoke of "finality" and relied
on dicta from Mitchell to suggest that interlocutory appeals lie from both




117. Id at 842 (citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319 (1995)). Like district courts,
appellate courts are not to "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to
determine whetherthere is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 249 (1986). If material facts are in dispute, then courts are to resolve the disputes in favor
of the nonmoving party. Id at 255. When district courts grant summary judgment motions,
"[t]here is no requirement that the trial judge make findings of fact." Id. at 250. The Supreme
Court has nevertheless stated, "In many cases, however, findings are extremely helpful to a
reviewing court." Id. at 250 n.6.
118. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 840 (1996).
119. See supra note 32 (discussing possible "fourth element" to collateral order doctrine).
120. Behrens, 116 S. Ct. at 839 (stating that"[u]nless the plaintiff s allegations state a claim
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Before the Behrens Court was the second interlocutory appeal from an
order denying summary judgment based on qualified immunity. With respect
to the question of finality, the Court held that a second interlocutory appeal
from a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is not less
"final" because of a prior interlocutory appeal seeking dismissal on qualified
immunity grounds.2 ' Such a conclusion seems obvious. After discovery, the
record is fully established and an appellate court can be well situated to address
the question of whether the law was clearly established.
The Court, however, in dicta provided expansive statements supporting
the belief that interlocutory appeals would also lie from motions to dismiss. "
Neither the majority nor the dissent thought that appeals from motions to
dismiss should be per se barred under the collateral order doctrine."2 The
dissent only argued that an official should have only one appeal. 24 It did not
argue that such an appeal should only come from an order denying summary
judgment."2
The Court appeared to merge the final resolution element with the
unreviewability element. It emphasized that motions to dismiss and motions
for summary judgment raise different issues.126 A motion to dismiss, according
to the Court, raises the question whether the "conduct as alleged in the
complaint" violated clearly established law.127 A summary judgment motion
questions whether the evidence indicates a violation of clearly established
law. '2 Because of these differences, the Court suggested that officials may
need interlocutory appeals from both motions. 29 The question ofwhether such
appeals raise unreviewable issues is, however, different from the question of
of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to
dismissal before the commencement of discovery") (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
526 (1985)).
121. Id. at 839.
122. Id. at 840. The Court explained how to review interlocutory appeals from motions
to dismiss: "[I]t is the defendant's conduct as alleged in the complaint that is scrutinized for
'objective legal reasonableness.'' Id. The Court also broadly stated:
It is no more true that the defendant who has unsuccessfully appealed denial of a
motion to dismiss has no need to appeal denial of a motion for summary judgment,
than it is that the defendant who has unsuccessfully made a motion to dismiss has
no need to make a motion for summary judgment.
Id.
123. Id.; see also id. at 843 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 844 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 840.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 842.
129. Id. at 840.
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whether a particular motion conclusively determines an issue, as required by
the collateral order doctrine.130
With respect to the second element, separability, the Court stated in a
footnote that appellate courts should not resolve this issue by comparing the
two interlocutory appeals to each other.13 1 Instead, according to the Court,
separability focuses on whether the asserted issue for review, qualified
immunity, is separate from the merits, not from a potential future appeal or
from a prior appeal. 32 Such a point is sound, but comparison of the appeals
should be relevant for determining the issue of final resolution, not separability.
The third element, unreviewability, was implicit in the Court's discussion
of the different procedural questions for motions to dismiss and motions for
summaryjudgment.'33 The Court found thatthe qualified immunity issue raised
in a motion to dismiss would not be reviewed in a motion for summary
judgment.
The "fourth element," the importance of the issue for interlocutory review,
seemed to be the centerpiece for both the majority3 3 and dissent.135 For the
majority, the "immunity of suit" prong of Harlow created an interest that
merited the protection of multiple appeals. 36 For the dissent, the Harlow quali-
fied immunity standard did not create an "anti-discovery right"'37 to be pro-
tected on interlocutory appeal.
In addition to these elements, the Court considered dicta in Mitchell to
justify multiple appeals. 31 In Mitchell, a plurality of the Court stated that
officials asserting qualified immunity are "entitled to dismissal before the
commencement of discovery"' 39 or may be "entitled to summary judgment if
discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to
whether the defendant in fact committed those acts."'4 The Behrens Court
used this language from Mitchelltojustify multiple appeals. In sharp contrast,
the Johnson Court referred to this summary judgment language in Mitchell as
discussing only the entitlement to summary judgment, not to the entitlement
to an interlocutory appeal. 4 '
130. See supra text accompanying notes 28-32.
131. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 840 n.3 (1996).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 840.
134. Id. at 839-40.
135. Id. at 844 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
136. Id at 840.
137. Id at 845 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 839.
139. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
140. Behrensv. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 839 (1996) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526).
141. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313-314 (1995).
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The Court has thus suggested in Mitchell and its progeny that interlocutory
appeals would sometimes lie both from motions for dismissal as well as for
summaryjudgment. In Johnson, the Court made an important distinction. An
entitlement to summary judgment can be different from the right to an inter-
locutory appeal. 142 The interlocutory appeal requires the appellate court to have
jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. In contrast, the summary
judgment motion only examines the two elements for summary judgment, the
absence of material disputed facts and entitlement to judgment as a matter of
law. An examination of the Court's comments on procedures shows how it
has interpreted the immunity-of-suit prong tojustify early dismissal or summary
judgment.
1. The Supreme Court's View of the Appellate Record:
Motions for Dismissal and Summary Judgment Raising Qualified Immunity
During interlocutory appeals from orders denying qualified immunity, the
Supreme Court has broadly interpreted and sometimes implicitly rewritten the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Perhaps these interpretative problems have
occurred because the Court has only generally referred to motions for dismissal
and motions for summary judgment, not to specific rules. The applicable Rules
are Rule 12(b)(6),'43 which provides for dismissal when plaintiffs fail to state
a claim; Rule 12(c), 1" which provides forjudgment on the pleadings; and Rule
56(c),'45 which provides for summary judgment. The Court has generally
discussed procedure with respect to both prongs of the qualified immunity
defense - the defense-of-liability prong and the immunity-of-suit prong.
Placing the Court's procedural comments inthe framework of the typical course
of litigation involves motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment before
discovery, and motions for summary judgment after discovery.
A. Motions to Dismiss
The traditional rules of procedure require plaintiffs to provide "a short
and plain statement of the claim" in their complaints, 46 and officials are to raise
142. Id. at 317-18.
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (providing for dismissal when plaintiffs fail "to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted").
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (stating that judgment on pleadings does not allow court to
consider materials outside pleadings).
145. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (stating that summary judgment is allowed if "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law").
146. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
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the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in their answers. 47 The Court's
suggestion of a "heightened pleading" standard for plaintiffs conflicts with
these traditional rules. 4 Under the Court's suggested "heightened pleading"
standard, plaintiffs are to anticipate that officials will raise this defense in their
answer and, thus, should specifically allege facts that reveal that the law was
clearly established when the officials violated their constitutional rights.'49
In addition to this reworking of the Federal Rules, the Court also suggested
in Siegert v. Gilley ° that courts should first decide whether plaintiffs have
stated constitutional violations before determining whether the law was clearly
established.', The need to initially decide whether plaintiffs have stated
constitutional violations is not clear'52 because, since Siegert, the Court has
147. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c); see Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (holding that
qualified immunity is affirmative defense that plaintiffs do not need to anticipate in their com-
plaints).
148. The Supreme Court in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit rejected applying a heightened pleading standard to lawsuits against local
governmental entities. Leatherman v. Tarrant CountyNarcotics Intelligence& Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). The Court did, however, specifically leave open whether there is a
heightened pleading standard for plaintiffs asserting violations of their constitutional rights by
officials sued in their individual capacity. Id at 166. In three opinions, the Court suggested that
such a standard is applicable. InMitchellv. Forsyth, a plurality ofthe Court stated that,"[u]nless
theplaintiff's allegations state a claim ofviolation ofclearly established law, adefendantpleading
qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery." Mitchell
v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1993). In two decisions since Leatherman, the Court in dicta
discussed motions to dismiss. In Behrens v. Pelletier, the Court declared that in a motion for
dismissal "it is the defendant's conduct as alleged in the complaint that is scrutinized for
'objective legal reasonableness."' Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 840 (1996). In Johnson
v. Fankell, the Court stated that, "when the complaint fails to allege a violation of clearly estab-
lished law... [the qualified immunity defense] provides the defendant with an immunity from
the burdens of trial as well as a defense to liability." Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1800, 1803
(1997). When hinting that aheightened pleading standard would apply, the Court thusjudicially
"amended" the Federal Rules of Procedure to further Harlow's goal of ridding meritless suits.
149. For a detailed discussion of the heightened pleading issue, see Karen M. Blum,
Heightened Pleading: Is There Life After Leatherman, 44 CATH. U. L. REv. 59, 71-95 (1994).
Professor Blum contends that "[n]o special pleading burden should be placed on plaintiffs in
section 1983 individual capacity suits." Id. at 92. See generally Eric Kugler, A 1983 Hurdle:
Filtering Meritless Civil Rights Litigation at the Pleading Stage, 15 REv. LITG. 551, 562-65,
576 (1996) (advocating Congress amend Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to require plaintiffs
to provide reply to official's answer that asserts qualified immunity).
150. 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
151. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226,232 (1991) (stating court of appeals should have first
decided whether plaintiff had stated claim).
152. Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Siegert appropriately rejected requiring courts to
first decide whether the plaintiff has stated a claim when officials assert qualified immunity.
L at 235 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "it seems to reverse the usual ordering of issues
to tell the trial and appellate courts that they should resolve the constitutional question first").
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failed to follow its own ruling.'53 For example, in both Hunter v. Bryant"4 and
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,'55 the Court addressed the immunity issue without
determining whether the officials had violated the Constitution.'56
Under the Court's procedural perspective, appellate courts are to exam-
ine plaintiffs' complaints and ask whether the allegations state a violation of
clearly established law. In doing so, courts are to assume that the facts as
alleged by the plaintiff are true. 7 If allegations do not state a violation of
clearly established law, then officials are entitled to dismissal. Dismissal is
also possible under Siegert if the complaint does not allege a constitutional
violation.'58
B. Motions for Summary Judgment Before Discovery
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court reformulated the qualified immunity
standard to eliminate meritless cases in motions for summary judgment before
discovery 59 Yet, as the Court has noted both in Johnson v. Fankell and
Anderson v. Creighton, some cases cannot be dismissed before discovery.6
See generally Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (advocating principle ofresolving case on nonconstitutional grounds ifpossible).
In response to Siegert's ordering of the issues, several courts have wisely not followed the Court's
ruling. See, e.g., DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 799 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating court should
be able to resolve case "on the most expedient ground"). One scholar has correctly noted that
the proper procedure for determining whether the plaintiff has stated a claim is a motion for
dismissal under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6). Chen, supra note 1,280 n.107 (1995)
(stating that" [i]t is clearto me that the Court's characterization of its immunity analysis inSiegert
is misguided, for that ordering of decision making suggests that the Court is not engaged in
qualified immunity analysis at all").
153. See, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.
224 (1991).
154. 502 U.S. 224 (1991).
155. 509 U.S. 259 (1993).
156. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,267 n.3 (1993); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.
224, 228 (1991).
157. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 840 (1996).
158. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 229-30 (1991). In Siegert, the Court considered an
appeal from a district court's order, which denied the official's motion to dismiss or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment. Id. at 229. The official took an interlocutory appeal when
the district court ruled that discovery could proceed. Id. at 230. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia determined that the plaintiff failed to state a constitutional violation. Id.
The Court then determined that the plaintiff's allegations were insufficient to overcome the
qualified immunity defense. Id. at 230-3 1.
159. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
160. Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1803, 1803 n.2 (1997) (stating that "when a case can
be dismissed on the pleadings or in an early pre-trial stage, qualified immunity also provides
officials with the valuable protection from 'the burdens of broad-ranging discovery' (quoting
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In Anderson, the Court suggested how courts should decide whether to grant
discovery.' It also noted, that if courts were to grant discovery, they should
tailor it to the immunity question. 62
The Anderson Court offered a two-part inquiry for determining when to
grant discovery under the circumstances of that case. 63 The first question
focuses on the plaintiffs' allegations; the second focuses on the official's
"admitted" conduct." The court is to examine whether each states a violation
of clearly established law. 65
If the plaintiff fails to allege a violation of clearly established law, then
the official is entitled to "dismissal prior to discovery." 66 This view is consis-
tent with how the Supreme Court has suggested that courts view motions for
dismissal on qualified immunity grounds. Courts assume that the allegations
are truthful and determine whether the challenged actions are ones "that a
reasonable officer could have believed lawful."'67 Ifthey are, then the official
would be entitled to qualified immunity because the official would not have
violated clearly established law.
If the plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient then the court examines the
official's asserted conduct and questions whetherthe official's version ofwhat
happened indicates a violation of clearly established law. If it does, then in
light of the qualified immunity standard as interpreted by the Court, the official
would not have qualified immunity.
The Anderson Court proceeded to address the more common situation -
when the plaintiffs allegations state a violation of clearly established law and
the official's version does not indicate a violation of clearly established law.'68
In that situation, a court should grant discovery.'69 As the Anderson Court
noted, this discovery is not broad-ranging. Instead, it is to be narrowly focused
on the resolution of factual issues to aid in deciding the immunity question in
a motion for summary judgment after discovery.'
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818)); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987).
161. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646 n.6.
162. Id.
163. At issue in Anderson was a warrantless search for a fugitive. An FBI agent had
allegedly entered the plaintiffs' home searching for a person who did not reside there. The
plaintiffs alleged that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 637.
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C. Motions for Summary Judgment After Discovery
When a district court denies summary judgment, asserting qualified
immunity after discovery has occurred, its order may specify different
underlying bases for its decisions: (1) it may only state that material facts are
in dispute; (2) it may state that the facts are not in dispute and that the law was
clearly established; or (3) it may state that material facts are disputed and that
the law was clearly established. The Supreme Court considered the first
scenario in Johnson and did not find appellatejurisdiction. 7' With respect to
the second and third situations, the Court in Behrens v. Pelletier"7 impliedly
found them indistinguishable. 73 Behrens and Johnson also provided that even
if the district court's order does not specify which facts are in dispute, an
appellate court may review the entire record on appeal. This review would be
to hypothetically reconstruct the district court's assumed facts.174 Thus, even
if district courts do not specify the assumed facts for summary judgment, an
appellate court is to view the record'in a light more favorable to the plaintiff
and ask the central question for interlocutory appeals: Was the law clearly
established in light of the facts hypothesized by the appellate court?
Whether an appellate court hasjurisdictionto hear an interlocutory appeal
from a motion to dismiss or from a motion for summary judgment is a complex
matter, one that also invites consideration of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. An examination ofthe Court's interpretation ofthe collateral order
doctrine reveals that the Court is expanding appellatejurisdiction and ignoring
some of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
V The Proper Scope of Interlocutory Appeals from Orders Denying
Qualified Immunity
The Supreme Court and appellate courts have ignored important limits
on their jurisdiction.'75 Limits come from the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Seventh Amendment, 76 a more narrow interpretation of the collateral order
doctrine, and appropriate deference to district courts and Congress. If courts
adhered to these limits, they would have jurisdiction for appeals from some
171. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1995).
172. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 842 (1996).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 108-17 (discussing Supreme Court's perspective
on motions for summary judgment after discovery in which district court denies qualified
immunity as defense).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 103, 115-17.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 6-12; supra notes 6-9.
176. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (providing that "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved").
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orders denying summary judgment, before1" and after discovery,'78 and no
jurisdiction for appeals from orders denying motions to dismiss 79 on qualified
immunity grounds, nor from orders denying judgment on the pleadings."' 0
A. Orders for Dismissal
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Behrens erroneously suggested
that interlocutory appeals would lie from denials of motions to dismiss raising
qualified immunity as a defense. In this decision, without analysis of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court assumed that such motions properly
raised the central qualified immunity question - whether the law was clearly
established when the official acted. Instead of discussing the Rules, the Court
briefly examined the three elements of the collateral order doctrine: finality,
separability, and unreviewability. It found that interlocutory appeals from
motions to dismiss met all three requirements. In contrast, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and a narrower construction of the collateral order doctrine
support finding no interlocutory jurisdiction for appeals from orders denying
qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss.
When officials file motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, they
are generally seeking to dismiss the action because the plaintifffailed to allege
a violation of clearly established law. Two provisions are common: Rule
12(b)(6),"' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Rule 12(c), I8 2
motion for judgment on the pleadings.
1. Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
Under the traditional view of Rule 12(b)(6), a district court would have
to consider only whether the plaintiff stated a claim. Because qualified
immunity is an affirmative defense, officials must plead it in their answers.'83
With the injection of the qualified immunity defense in the answer, a motion
for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) based on qualified immunity is improper
because it goes outside the traditional scope of the rule -whether the plaintiff
has alleged a claim.
Interlocutory appeals will not lie from such motions despite the Supreme
Court's statement in Siegertv. Gilleythat in considering the qualified immunity
177. See infra text accompanying notes 200-09.
178. See infra text accompanying notes 236-41.
179. See infra text accompanying notes 181-86.
180. See infra text accompanying notes 187-199.
181. See supra note 143.
182. See supra note 144.
183. Gomezv. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
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defense, courts should first consider whether the plaintiff has stated a claim."'
First, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the qualified immunity
defense cannot be raised in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Second, Siegert assumed that the reviewing court had jurisdiction to decide
whether the law was clearly established. The collateral order doctrine requires
the issue raised on an interlocutory appeal to be separate from the merits.
Because a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim raises a question only
about the merits, it is not reviewable within the terms of the collateral order
doctrine.
Furthermore, courts should also note when interpreting the collateral order
doctrine as to appeals from motions to dismiss that the discussion of motions
to dismiss in Behrens was dicta. At issue was whether a summary judgment
motion after discovery was final within the meaning of the collateral order doc-
trine. Even though the record did raise the question of multiple appeals, the
Court's comments on appeals from motions to dismiss are different from its
determination that more than one appeal is possible.' For example, appeals
may lie from some summary judgment motions both before and after dis-
covery. 
186
Thus, under the appellate courts' erroneous heightened pleading standard,
not only have the courts rewritten pleading rules, but they have also expanded
jurisdiction without serious consideration as to the separability element neces-
sary for appellate review under the collateral order doctrine. There simply is
no appellate jurisdiction to review a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
constitutional violation.
2. Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings
Appellate courts also do not havejurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals
from orders denying qualified immunity from motions for judgment on the
pleadings. The problem for the reviewing court does not lie with procedural
rules, but rather with the collateral order doctrine.
In a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), courts
typically considertwo pleadings-the plaintiff' s complaintandthe defendant's
184. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). For a discussion of Siegert, see supra
text accompanying notes 150-52, 158.
185. For example, in the related area ofabsolute immunity, the Court heard an interlocutory
appeal from President Clinton that argued neither for absolute immunity nor qualified immunity;
the President simply argued that under absolute immunity jurisprudence, a deferral both of
discovery and trial was appropriate until he completed his second term. Clinton v. Jones, 117
S. Ct. 1636, 1640 (1997). The Court's rejection of the President's request for deferral surely
does not bar him from asserting qualified immunity and seeking any interlocutory appeals that
comply with the procedural rules and the collateral order doctrine.
186. See infra text accompanying notes 200-09, 236-41.
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answer. 87 Under Rule 7, a district court has discretion to order the plaintiff
to reply to the defendant's answer. 88 When the district court has so ordered,
a motion for judgment on the pleadings would consider the complaint, the
answer, and the reply.
Although this motion allows officials to raise qualified immunity in their
answers, the plaintiff need not anticipate the affirmative defense in the
complaint. The plaintiff may, however, address the immunity question in a
reply. To further Harlow's goal of getting rid of meritless suits as soon as
possible, one appellate court has infringed upon the district court's discretion
to order a reply.89 It has suggested that in most cases the reply must be
forthcoming. 9'
Under the traditional rules of procedure, plaintiffs need not plead with
specificity in the complaint and district courts have discretion to order replies.
If in a given case the district court had the discretion to order a reply and did
so, then the qualified immunity issue would be procedurally raised as provided
for under the rules.
The next question would be whether the order denying qualified immunity
from a motion for judgment on the pleadings meets the three elements of the
collateral order doctrine. In contrast to the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the collateral order doctrine in Behrens, courts should recognize that such
appeals meet the final resolution and separability elements, but do not meet
the unreviewability element of the collateral order doctrine.
The separability element is always met when the issue before the appellate
court is whether the law was clearly established when the official took the
challenged action. The Mitchell plurality first explained that such an issue is
separable from the merits because it does not ask two questions: whether the
plaintiff's allegations are "correct" or whether the plaintiff has stated a claim.
A review for "correctness" is a review examining the sufficiency of the
evidence, an issue that explores the merits of the case and is thus not
separable. 9 ' Similarly, whether the plaintiff has stated a claim is a merits
question. Yet, if the appellate court has jurisdiction to decide the clearly
established issue, it has discretion to decide whether the plaintiff has stated a
claim, because this latter issue is logically a part of the qualified immunity
question. If there is no constitutional violation at all, then the law could not
have been clearly established that the official acted in violation of the Constitu-
tion. But whether there was a constitutional violation and whether there was
187. See supra note 144.
188. See supra note 7.
189. Schulteav. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc). For adiscussion
of Schultea, see supra note 7.
190. Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433.
191. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313-15 (1995).
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a violation of a clearly established right are still separate questions, and the
second question is not a "merits" issue.
Similarly, when the issue before the appellate court is whether the law was
clearly established, the finality element is met whether officials assert qualified
immunity as to a single claim or multiple claims. When reviewing a single
claim, if the court decides that the law was not clearly established, it finally
resolves a disputed issue that is separate from the merits. When a court
considers multiple claims, it may grant qualified immunity as to some claims
and not to others. The Supreme Court in Behrens properly recognized that
jurisdiction exists over appeals from orders denying qualified immunity for
multiple claims. 92 To hold otherwise would be to give plaintiffs the power
to deny interlocutory review and to nullify the immunity-from-suit prong by
simply appending a claim for which qualified immunity clearly does not apply,
such as a claim for equitable relief.93
If, however, the appellate court determines, based on the plaintiff's
allegations, that the law was clearly established, then officials may raise
qualified immunity later in the lawsuit - by motions for summary judgment
before and after discovery'94 and by motions forjudgment as a matter of law.'95
This ability to raise the qualified immunity defense repeatedly is why courts
need to consider the third element for jurisdiction under the collateral order
doctrine - unreviewability.
The Behrens Court did not have to specify how many appeals were
possible. Before the court was the question of an interlocutory appeal from
a denial of motion for summary judgment after discovery. It failed, however,
to discuss the purpose of the final judgment statute - opposition to piecemeal
appeals.'96 It simply did not see a piecemeal problem on the horizon. Itnaively
stated that decisional law reflects that officials do not take multiple interlocu-
tory appeals. Although case law did indicate the rarity of multiple appeals, the
192. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 841-42 (1996).
193. Id. at 842.
194. See infra text accompanying notes 200-09, 236-41.
195. FED. R. Civ. P. 50 (providing that courts may grantjudgment as matter of law during
trials and after trials). See, e.g., Spann v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1113-14 (5th Cir. 1993)
(determining interlocutory appeal would lie after district court ordered new trial because official
still has defense to liability, even if asserted for first time); Rellergert v. Cape Girardeau County,
924 F.2d 794,796(8th Cir. 1991) (stating that official may raise qualified immunity during "trial
and after judgment"); Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180, 1206 (7th Cir. 1988) (same); Krause
v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 368 n.3 (2d Cir. 1989) (same).
196. See, e.g., Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability By Court Rule:
RightProblem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. Prr. L. REv. 717,726 (1993) (stating that "ChiefJustice
Marshall... surmised that Congress intended the final judgment rule to be amechanism to avoid
'all the delays and expense incident to a repeated revision' of fragmented appeals of a single
issue") (quoting United States v. Bailey, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 354, 355 (1835)).
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reason they were not common should have been apparent to the Court. Many
courts of appeal, like the lower court in Behrens,'97 had previously interpreted
the final judgment statute to bar multiple appeals.'
The Behrens Court found that appeals from "motions to dismiss" using
a heightened pleading standard and from motions for summary judgment both
met the unreviewability element. To justify its conclusion, the Court simply
restated the questions asked by the motions, using its procedural bending of
Rule 12. (The motion to dismiss questions whether the plaintiff has stated a
violation of clearly established law, and the motion for summary judgment
examines the evidence in light most favorable to the plaintiffand asks whether
the law was clearly established.) Behrens linked the need for review with the
presence of multiple motions provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure. It
suggested thatjust because an official loses a motion to dismiss does not mean
the official has no need to make a motion for summary judgment.
A more narrow interpretation of the reviewability requirement suggests
that interlocutory appeals lie from motions for summary judgment before
discovery, but not from motions for judgment on the pleadings or motions to
dismiss.'99 Although each motion can be brought before discovery and asks
the same reviewable question (Was the law clearly established?), the motion
for summary judgment can be brought before discovery. The motion for sum-
mary judgment allows the plaintiff to submit affidavits to elaborate on the
simple and plain statement in the complaint, as allowed by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. In examining these three motions, appellate courts should
determine the unreviewability element to be met only by the motion for
summaryjudgment before discovery. Appellate courts would properly afford
deference to Congress, who enacted the final judgment statute and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
B. Orders for Summary Judgment Before Discovery
The Supreme Court has stated that the qualified immunity defense can
be resolved in summaryjudgment motions both before °" and after discovery.2"'
197. Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 968 F.2d 865, 870 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that
"[o]ne such interlocutory appeal is all that a government official is entitled to and all that we
will entertain"), rev'dsub nom. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct 834, 842 (1996).
198. The Behrens decision thus reversed the one-interlocutory appeal rule in numerous
circuits. See, e.g., Abel v. Miller, 904 F.2d 394, 396-97 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that single
appellate review as to whether there shall be trial is sufficient and that "[u]nless courts ofappeals
are careful, appeals on the authority of Mitchell could ossify civil rights litigation").
199. See supra text accompanying notes 183-98.
200. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818-19 (1982).
201. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 842 (1996).
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 3 (1998)
In doing so, it clearly indicated that officials may have two summaryjudgment
motions and that the distinction between the two is the presence or absence of
discovery. Although repetitive summary judgments motions are generally not
permitted under Rule 56,202 the Supreme Court has suggested two motions in
the context of qualified immunity. The first motion is the more difficult of the
two to understand because motions for summary judgment after discovery are
commonplace. Motions for summaryjudgment before discovery asserting qual-
ified immunity raise difficult procedural and jurisdictional questions on appeal.
1. Procedural Interpretations
Under Rule 56(c), district courts focus on two major issues: whetherthere
are material disputed facts and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. In discussing summary judgment motions before discovery,
the Court in Harlow andAnderson considered only how the qualified immunity
defense could be successfully asserted as a matter of law. If the law was not
clearly established, then immunity was available on a motion for summary
judgment before discovery.
When officials move for summary judgment before discovery, their
motions may be built on different views of the plaintiff's complaint and ability
to support the allegations in the complaint. Three situations are probably
common: (1) the officials believe that even under the plaintiff's version of
what happened, they did not violate clearly established law; (2) even if the
plaintiffs version of what happened indicates a violation of clearly established
law, she does not have evidence to support her version; or (3) the officials do
not adopt the plaintiffs version of what happened and argue that under their
version of the facts the law was not clearly established.
The first situation may be what the Harlow Court envisioned when it
stated in dicta, "[u]ntil the threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery
should not be allowed." The threshold immunity question is whether the law
was clearly established. In a summary judgment motion before discovery, a
202. See, e.g.,Enlowv. Tishomingo County, 962F.2d 501, 507 (5th Cir. 1992) (permitting
interlocutory appeal from second summary judgment motion that occurred after discovery). In
Enlow, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed that the second summary judgment motion
must offer an "expanded record." Id. at 506. The second motion must be different otherwise
an appeal from the second motion would make "a mockery of the requirement that notice to
appeal must be perfected within thirty days after the date of entry of the judgment or order." Id.
at 506 (citing FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)); see also Armstrong v. Texas State Bd. ofBarber Exam'rs,
30 F.3d 643, 644 (5th Cir. 1994) (determining that there was no jurisdiction from order that
denied summary judgment on qualified immunity because it was indistinguishable from district
court's prior order denying official's motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds). See
generally 11 JAMES WM. MooRE ETAL., MooRE'SFEDERAL PRACTICE 56.10[7] (3d ed. 1997)
(stating summary judgment is permissible if second motion is "sufficiently distinct" from first).
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plaintiff has not had an opportunity to develop a detailed evidentiary trail to
prove her version. The lack of discovery is not as problematic if officials
contend that for the sake of this prediscovery motion the plaintiff's version of
the facts governs and that they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter
of law because the law was not clearly established. Although under summary
judgment rules, the moving party (the official in a civil rights action) does not
have to assume the truth of the nonmovant's factual allegation, the moving
party may nevertheless do so.2"3
If the motion for summary judgment before discovery assumes the
truthfulness ofthe plaintiff's allegations, then itwould be similarto the Court's
overly broad view of motions to dismiss.2 Both would assume the plaintiff's
allegations are true and ask whether the law was clearly established. Yet, at
this procedural stage, a plaintiff may submit affidavits to rebut the qualified
immunity defense." 5
Under the second situation, officials are not assuming the truthfulness of
the plaintiffs version of what happened. Instead, they are focusing on the
evidentiary support for the plaintiffs version. Traditional summary judgment
motions can focus on evidentiary insufficiency, probably because discovery
has occurred. In contrast, such a focus by officials asserting qualified immunity
may be problematic when discovery has not occurred.2" 6 Without discovery,
aplaintiffwould need to engage in "informal discovery," in which the plaintiff
attempts to gather evidence on her own. Ifthe claim before the court indicates
that important information lies solely in the official's reach, then the district
court judge may apply Rule 56(f). 7 and authorize limited discovery.
203. Such a procedure is similarto the Behrens Court's handling of disputed material facts
on interlocutory appeals. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 842 (1996). InBehrens, the Court
instructed appellate courts to decide whether the official is entitled to summary judgment by using
the district court's assumed facts, those that the district court found sufficiently supported. 1d.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 146-58.
205. Thus by considering summaryjudgment before discovery, courts would not necessarily
have to impose a heightened pleading standard for writing complaints.
206. InSiegertv. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991), only JusticeKennedy thoughtthat therewas
no problem because he labeled qualified immunity a "substantive defense" derived from Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Yet, in Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct.1 800 (1997), hejoined
the Courtto label the rightto an interlocutory appeal aprocedural right To distinguish substance
from procedure, one may note that state courts in § 1983 actions must consider the qualified
immunity defense if properly raised, but they do not have to grant interlocutory appeals from
orders denying qualified immunity. See, e.g., Rose v. Howlett, 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
207. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f). This rule affords district courts discretion in allowing further
development of the facts. The rule provides:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
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The third type of motion also raises discovery problems. In this situa-
tion, because the record is so undeveloped, a district court may similarly rule
that discovery is necessary before resolving the clearly established law ques-
tion. With these contrasting "positional" postures for summary judgment
motions before discovery, the next question is whether an appellate courtwould
have jurisdiction from orders denying qualified immunity arising from these
motions.
2. Jurisdictional Interpretation
With respect to the three motions, jurisdiction will lie when discovery is
not necessary to resolve the motion for summary judgment. The first motion
is free from a discovery problem because it assumes, for purposes of this
summary judgment motion, that the plaintiff's allegations govern. The second
and third motions can raise discovery problems.
If courts assume the truthfulness of the plaintiff s allegations in a motion
for summary judgment before discovery, then the only question raised on inter-
locutory appeal is whether these allegations state a violation of clearly estab-
lished law. This issue meets all threejurisdictional elements -final resolution,
separability, and unreviewability.
First, if the appellate court reverses the district court's decision and deter-
mines that the law was not clearly established, then the appellate court would
be conclusively determining the qualified immunity issue. The official would
have qualified immunity from the claim under consideration. Second, such
an issue is separate from the merits of the case. It does not require courts to
determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim or whether the evidence is
sufficient to support the plaintiff's claim.
Third, it is also technically unreviewable at a later procedural stage. In
a motion for summary judgment before discovery, officials are seeking not only
freedom from paying damages and atrial, but more importantly, freedom from
discovery. Such a determination before discovery is possible if the court uses
the plaintiff's version of what happened.
In contrast, the second type of summary judgment motion before discovery
invites the appellate court to determine evidentiary insufficiency. This type
of review would fail to meet the separability requirement of the collateral order
doctrine, as properly noted in Johnson."'8 What is missing in this motion is
a challenge to whether the law was clearly established.
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
Id.
208. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313-15 (1995). For a discussion of the separability
problem, see supra text accompanying note 191.
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The third kind of motion may raise a discovery problem because the
officials and the plaintiff may dispute the material facts. This is the hypotheti-
cal situation posed in Anderson, where the Court authorized tailored
discovery." 9 If officials assert that the law was not clearly established and do
not adopt the plaintiffs version, a district court may issue an order postponing
its decision until discovery has occurred. Typically officials would then seek
protection from discovery. If denied, they may attempt to appeal the order
denying protection. Addressing the jurisdictional issue for the third summary
judgment motion is thus linked to the appealability of discovery orders.
C. Orders Granting Discovery
According to both Harlow v. Fitzgerald and Anderson v. Creighton, the
qualified immunity defense sometimes makes discovery unnecessary and
sometimes requires tailored discovery.10 The propriety of discovery depends
upon the official's acceptance or rejection of the plaintiff's facts. Under
Harlow, district courts may decide a summary judgment motion based on
qualified immunity before discovery has occurred.211 UnderAnderson, district
courts are to order tailored discovery if the plaintiff alleges a violation of
clearly established law and the officials contend that they did not do what the
plaintiff alleges and that their true actions did not violate clearly established
law.2" 2 When district courts allow discovery to proceed, officials will often
file motions for protection from discovery. Some of these orders fulfill the
requirements of the collateral order doctrine.2" 3 Others do not.214
A district court's order denying protection from discovery often occurs
in two situations. First, district courts sometimes order discovery after denying
an official's motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds.2 5 (Complying
with current procedural rules, officials should raise qualified immunity in
209. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987).
210. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646 n.6; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19.
211. Harlow, 457 U.S. 818.
212. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646 n.6. When district courts before discovery determine
whether the law was clearly established based on the complaint and the supporting affidavits,
they typically are faced with two contrasting stories ofwhat happened. In these situations, under
the plaintiff's version ofthe facts, the official violated clearly established law; under the official's
version, no constitutional violation occurred, or if one did, the law was not clearly established.
At this point, district courts properly deny the official's summary judgment motion raising
qualified immunity and allow tailored discovery. Id.
213. See infra text pp. 37-39.
214. See infra text pp. 39-40.
215. If officials did not move for summary judgment before discovery, an appellate court
may interpret their failure as waiving their right to appeal at that procedural stage. Another
interlocutory appeal would protect their right to be free from trial after discovery has occurred.
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motions for summaryjudgment before discovery, not in motions to dismiss.)" 6
Second, district courts sometimes postpone deciding officials' motions to
dismiss based on qualified immunity until discovery has concluded. In the first
situation, the orders denying protection from discovery raise the general
prohibition against allowing interlocutory appeals from discovery orders and
are rarely appealable.217 The second situation implicates the finality issues of
motions for summary judgment before discovery and should be appealable2 "
unless such an appeal would be frivolous.219
1. Discovery After Denying Qualified Immunity
When district courts deny qualified immunity in motions for summary
judgment before discovery, they have issued an order from which an interlocu-
tory appeal would lie, as long as the appeal is not frivolous. In this appeal, the
appellate court can vindicate a right protected by the immunity-from-suit
prong - the right to be free from avoidable discovery. If the appellate court
disagrees with the district court, then the officials will have immunity and be
free from discovery. If the appellate court agrees with the district court,
implicit in the court's ruling is that discovery should go forward.
Yet, the Anderson Court indicated that when the facts of a case warrant
discovery, such discovery should be tailored to the qualified immunity question.
Anderson thus suggests that officials should not be subject to overly broad
discovery. Thus, even if discovery is permissible, officials sometimes seek
protection from overly broad discovery.Y° Under the collateral order doctrine,
appellate courts should determine that they lack jurisdiction to hear these
appeals.
This doctrine requires courts to consider whether the asserted right to be
free from overly broad discovery is an important issue that meets the elements
of finality, separability, and unreviewability. How one applies these factors
216. See supra text accompanying notes 183-86, 200-09.
217. 15B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ETAL., FEDERAL PRACTICEAND PROCEDURE § 3914.23
(2d ed. 1992) (stating that although discovery orders have provided "a superb testing illustration
of the final judgment rule at work," "the rule remains settled that most discovery rulings are not
final"). But see Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Interlocutory Review of Discovery Orders: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come, 44 SW. L.J. 1045, 1047 (1990) (arguing that "interlocutory review of
discovery orders is not the demon that commentators fear").
218. See infra text accompanying notes 232-33.
219. See infra text accompanying notes 257-62.
220. See, e.g., Gaines v. Davis, 928 F.2d 705,707 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that "immediate
appeal is available for discovery orders which are either avoidable or overly broad"); Lion Boulos
v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that Supreme Court's decisions in Harlow
and Mitchell indicate "that qualified immunity does not shield government officials from all
discovery but only from discovery which is either avoidable or overly broad").
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depends ultimately on how one characterizes the official's appeal. One inter-
pretation is that the immunity-from-suit prong supports finding three interests
to be protected on interlocutory appeals: freedom from discovery, freedom
from overly broad discovery, and freedom from an unnecessary trial. To
support such an interpretation, one would need to broadly read Anderson's
admonition against overly broad discovery.
A better interpretation is to seethe interest in being free from overly broad
discovery as peripheral to the clear right to be free from discovery which, as
Anderson noted, is a limited right. Under this interpretation, appellate review
of the scope of discovery is not an "important" issue within the meaning of the
collateral order doctrine. The official's concern is sufficiently distinguishable
from the typical discovery concerns. Even though Harlow found civil rights
actions to be significantly different from the typical lawsuits, once a district
court has properly determined that discovery should proceed, the civil rights
lawsuit resembles the ordinary lawsuit. In that situation, appellate courts
should defer to the expertise of the trial courts in tailoring discovery. District
courts should not lose control of lawsuits nor should officials flood appellate
courts with multiple appeals from discovery rulings.
Such appeals do not satisfy all three elements of the collateral order
doctrine. Under the first element, finality may not be present because the
course of discovery may require multiple interventions by the district court.
The district court controls the course of discovery. The final judgment rule
would militate against allowing such piecemeal appeals.
Under the second element, such orders are separate from the merits. Yet,
they could invite appellate courts to pore over depositions to determine the
scope of discovery. Although the Court in Johnson permitted appellate courts
to do so when district courts fail to specify the assumed facts in denying
officials' summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity, it did find
this practice to be "cumbersome" and permissible under those limited circum-
stances." To allow such a practice with orders denying protection from
discovery would unduly infringe upon the district court's expertise in trial
management and the appellate court's role in resolving only fully developed
issues.
The third element, unreviewability, is more difficult. After discovery has
concluded, any harm that the official suffered as a result of overly broad
discovery is complete. The Harlow Court's transformation of the qualified
immunity standard was to further the goal of preventing officials from answer-
ing unnecessary interrogatories and attending depositions. In short, the scope
of discovery is unreviewable. Yet, even if courts were to review the district
court's granting of discovery, such review is generally limited to an abuse of
221. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319 (1995).
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discretion.222 This standard is built on the recognition of the trial court's
expertise in processing cases. With this heightened standard for review, few
appeals would be successful.
AlthoughAnderson clearly expressed a concern about limiting discovery,
interlocutory appeals should not lie from orders denying protection from
discovery if the district court's order followed an order denying qualified
immunity in a summary judgment motion before discovery. Inthe eventthat
district courts permit unreasonably broad discovery, officials should invoke
mandamus.' This procedure gives appellate courts discretion to hear such
appeals without "simultaneously opening the door to review of similar ques-
tions in all future cases.,
224
2. Discovery After Refusing to Decide Qualified Immunity Issue
District courts also deny motions for protection from discovery for the
stated reason that further factual development will aid them in resolving a prior
motion for summary judgment that raised qualified immunity.' At this
procedural stage, the district courts are making two rulings: one to deny
protection from discovery and one to defer deciding whether the law was
clearly established. 6 The first ruling raises the general issue of appealing from
222. See, e.g., Grahamv. Gray, 827 F.2d 679, 681 (10thCir. 1987) (statingthat "[a]lthough
the decision on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment clearly 'turns on an issue
of law,' .. . a trial court's decision to allow or deny discovery is discretionary, and subject to
review only for abuse of discretion") (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,530 (1985)).
223. 15B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 217, at 132-33 (stating that "mandamus is used with
some regularity").
224. Id. at 132.
225. See, e.g., Workman v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 332, 336 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that "an
order is not immediately appealable if it defers a decision on a qualified immunity claim because
the claim turns, at least partially, on a fact question"); Andre v. Castor, 963 F. Supp. 1169, 1171
(M.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that appeal was frivolous because official sought protection from
discovery before district court ruled on qualified immunity).
226. See, e.g., Wicks v. Mississippi State Employment Servs., 41 F.3d 991, 994 (5th Cir.
1995) (determining that interlocutory appeal would lie from order denying protection from
discovery when district court had not ruled on official's motion to dismiss). But see Whalen
v. County of Fulton, 19 F.3d 828, 830 (2d Cir. 1994) (determining that interlocutory appeal
would not lie from order that denied qualified immunity in summary judgment "motion without
prejudice to its renewal after further discovery").
Sometimes officials may struggle to distinguish between a district court's deferral of the
qualified immunity decision from a district court's failure to respond to a motion for qualified
immunity. See, e.g., Gosnell v. City of Troy, 979 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that
"because the order of the district court is entirely silent as to qualified immunity," the appellate
court faced "jurisdictional limbo"). In Gosnell, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals properly
held that it lacked jurisdiction from an order that did not decide that the law was clearly
established. Id. at 1261. The court stated that when officials are not certain as to whether a
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orders granting discovery. 7 In sharp contrast, the second ruling draws the
district court into the conflict between the primary goal of Harlow -to decide
whether the law was clearly established before discovery 8 - and the need for
discovery in a particular case. 29
When considering motions for summary judgment before discovery, a
district court's view of the facts depends upon how the official moves for
summary judgment. Ifthe official challenges the plaintiff s evidentiary suffi-
ciency, then discovery may be necessary. If discovery is necessary, then the
district courtwould notbe violatingHarlow's goal, freedom from unnecessary
discovery. It is possible for the district court to be wrong, however, in its
determination that discovery is necessary.
At that procedural stage, the district court has not made any determination
as to the clarity of the law, the typical issue for interlocutory appeal. One
means of getting review before discovery goes forward is for officials to adopt,
arguendo, the plaintiffs version of the facts and ask the district court to
determine the clarity of the law."o If officials do not seek review in this
manner, then perhaps discovery is necessary (or they have waived their right
to an appeal)."1
If the district court refuses to decide the clarity of law question using the
plaintiff's version of the facts and still orders discovery, then an interlocutory
appeal will lie from the district court's subsequent order denying protection
from discovery. 2 In so ruling, a district court would be ignoring Harlow's
district court has decided qualified immunity, they should file a "motion to reconsider or clarify."
Id. at 1260.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 217, 220-24.
228. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982).
229. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987).
230. See supra p. 35.
231. SeeAusterOil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 835 F.2d 597,601(5th Cir. 1988) (finding waiver
when officials did notmention qualified immunity in "pretrial order, or in oral orwritten motions
for directed verdict"); Iveyv. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950,957 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding waiver because
official did nottimely objectto magistrate's report); Justicev. Town ofBlackwell, 820 F.2d 238,
240-41 (7th Cir. 1987) (determining that interlocutory appeal would not lie when official waived
qualified immunity defense by failing to timely raise it in his answer; in alternative, even if
jurisdiction existed, determining that district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to allow
official to amend answer). Butsee generally Yates v. City of'Cleveland, 941 F.2d 444,449 (6th
Cir. 1991) (finding no waiver where trial court made no determination of frivolousness or waiver,
even though official "did not raise the qualified immunity defense until a full five years after the
filing of the complaint, and days before the trial was scheduled to commence").
232. See, e.g., Workman v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 332, 336 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that
appellate courts have jurisdiction from "orders postponing a decision" on motion to dismiss).
But see Wicks v. Mississippi State Employment Servs., 41 F.3d 991, 997 (5th Cir. 1995). In
Wicks, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals added one limitation to appellate jurisdiction when
a district court refuses to decide the clarity of law. Id. If the plaintiff's complaint meets a
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limits on discovery. When such a postponement is for the stated purpose of
allowing factual development, an interlocutory appeal should lie.
This denial of protection raises the same issue as does a decision denying
summary judgment before discovery. In the order denying protection, the
district court implicitly rules against the official, implying that there is no right
to determine whether the law was clearly established before granting discovery.
In an order denying qualified immunity in a motion for summary judgment
before discovery, the district court's ruling is explicit. Under these circum-
stances, a refusal to decide is tantamount to deciding that the immunity-from-
suit prong does not protect officials from unnecessary discovery.
In taking an interlocutory appeal from a denial based on a refusal to
decide, officials create a difficult issue for appellate courts to resolve. Appel-
late courts must decide whether they should resolve the question on appeal -
whether the law was clearly established - even though the district court has
not first answered this question. In contrast to the typical appeal, the appellate
court is unable to evaluate a district court's discussion of the qualified immu-
nity defense because it does not exist. The district court's refusal to decide
thus resulted in no opinion for review.
Some appellate courts decide the qualified immunity question, even though
the district court did not address the question. 3 Such an approach aids the
timely disposition of the case. Yet, the appellate court might not have all the
information before it as would a district court. The plaintiff may have not yet
submitted affidavits to support the general allegations in the complaint.
The better approach is for the appellate court to remand to the district
court.234 Such an order would compel the district court to decide the issue of
heightened pleading standard and discovery is necessary, then the district court need not rule
on the qualified immunity standard. Id. The Wicks court clearly stated it was not imposing a
"requirement that the district court must rule on a motion to dismiss prior to the allowance of
discovery in all situations." Id. at 997 n.27. The Fifth Circuit's concern is valid, but instead
of creating confusion as to the need for district courts to rule on the qualified immunity issue,
it should recognize that a denial of qualified immunity at one procedural stage does not mean
that officials are barred from raising qualified immunity later. See, e.g., Behrens v. Pelletier,
116 S. Ct. 834, 839 (1996). If the discovery is clearly necessary and the officials appeal, district
courts have the authority to certify such an appeal as frivolous. See infra text accompanying
notes 257-62. A better interpretation of Wicks is that in determining that the plaintiff's allegations
met the (erroneous) heightened pleading standard, the district court has ruled that the plaintiff's
allegations state a violation of clearly established law. This order would thus be appealable, if
one interprets it as arising from a motion for summary judgment before discovery. See supra
text accompanying notes 200-07.
233. See, e.g., Gallegos v. City & County of Denver, 984 F.2d 358,362 (10th Cir. 1993);
Collins v. School Bd. ofDade County, 981 F.2d 1203,1206 (1 lth Cir. 1993); Valiente v Rivera,
966 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1992).
234. See, e.g., Francisv. Coughlin, 849 F.2d 778,780 (2d Cir. 1988) ("When a district court
fails to address an immunity defense, it is generally appropriate to remand the case with
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whether the law was clearly established. Ifthe district court denied immunity,
then an interlocutory appeal might lie again. One important tool available to
district courts is the ability to certify an appeal as frivolous.3" Thus, if a
district court certifies the second appeal as frivolous, a second appeal would
not lie from the same question at the same procedural stage. Once discovery
occurs, the next issue is whether an interlocutory appeal will lie from a
summary judgment order again denying qualified immunity.
D. Orders for Summary Judgment After Discovery
When district courts deny qualified immunity in a motion for summary
judgment after discovery, the factual record is more developed. Under a motion
for summary judgment raising qualified immunity, district courts consider
whether there are disputed material facts and whether the official is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. The easy case for an interlocutory appeal is
when the district court determines that there are no disputed material facts and
denies qualified immunity. Such an appeal raises a single issue, for which
appellate courts clearly havejurisdiction- did the district court err in determin-
ing that the law was clearly established. Yet, when district courts rule that
material facts are disputed and deny qualified immunity, the question of
whether an interlocutory appeal lies is significantly more difficult. Jurisdiction
turns on whether appellate courts can address the clarity of law issue when
material facts are disputed.
In Behrens v. Pelletier, the Court offered two procedural solutions, one
proper and the other an institutional nightmare." Under the first procedural
solution, appellate courts use the "assumed" facts, those that the district court
explicitly stated in its order denying qualified immunity. 7 The "assumed"
facts are those that the district court found to be "sufficiently supported.""ns
The appellate court then asks whetherthose "assumed" facts indicate a violation
of clearly established law. If they do not, then the official has qualified
immunity. If they do, the official does not have immunity.
instructions to rule on the matter."); Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736, 742 (2d Cir. 1988)
(stating that remand is appropriate even if appellate court decides qualified immunity defense
as to otherclaims considered by district court); Craft v. Wipf, 810 F.2d 170, 171 (8th Cir. 1987)
(stating that appellate court hasjurisdiction but should remand for district courtto first determine
whether law was clearly established); Helton v. Clements, 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1986)
(same). See generallyBehrensv. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834 (1996) (remanding for court ofappeals
to determine whether law was clearly established in light of "assumed " facts).
235. See infra text accompanying notes 251-74.
236. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 842 (1996).
237. lad
238. Iad
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The second procedural solution applies when the district court does not
specify what facts it assumed. 9 Both Johnson and Behrens permit appellate
courts to "undertake a cumbersome review of the record to determine what facts
the district court... assumed.""40 After reviewing the record, the appellate
court articulates the presumed facts and decides the clearly established law
question.
The first procedural solution broadly protects the right to interlocutory
appeals, without encroaching upon the district court's expertise in deciding
whether facts are material and disputed. It avoids the problem of separability
by using the evidence that the district court found sufficiently supported. It
does not ask, however, the appellate court to determine what in fact happened.
The second procedural solution is a serious encroachment of the trial
court's function and the traditional practice of allowing the lower court to first
decide an issue. The Johnson Court initially recognized the trial courts'
expertise and the appellate courts' scarce resources. Yet, it, like Behrens,
surprisingly created this bizarre solution.
A sound solution is for appellate courts to use the facts the district court
articulated in its order. Even this approach is more easily applied in theory than
in practice. In using the articulated assumed facts, the appellate courts should
not feel free to supplement them.2"' To do so creates serious separability
problems. With this more narrow review, courts are able to properly review
the question of whether the law was clearly established in light of these
assumed facts. Such review fulfills all three elements of the collateral order
doctrine.
When officials appeal from district court orders that fail to specify the
assumed facts, a better practice is for the appellate court to either summarily
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or remand with direction to provide the "as-
sumed facts." Such an appeal cannot fulfill the separability requirement of the
collateral order doctrine. When the case returns to the district court, the judge
can specify the facts. An interlocutory appeal would then lie, unless the district
court certifies the appeal as frivolous.
In summary, interlocutory appeals lie from orders denying qualified
immunity because the district court determined that the law was clearly
established. Such orders can occur in motions for summary judgment before
discovery if the officials adopt the plaintiff's version of the facts for the
purpose of the motion. Orders denying qualified immunity can also occur as
a result ofprediscovery motions denying summary judgment in two situations:
239. Id.
240. Id. at 842 (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319 (1995)).
241. See supra note 8 (citing cases where federal courts of appeal have erroneously ignored
district court's expertise in specifying assumed facts).
INTERLOCUTORYAPPEALS AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 45
Either there are no material disputed facts or, if disputed facts do exist, the
district court's order specifies assumed facts. Additionally, interlocutory
appeals can lie from orders denying protection from discovery when the district
court also refuses to decide whether the law was clearly established.
Supplementing thesejurisdictional complexities are appeals from orders
declaring that a defendant is not an "official," but rather a private person not
entitled to qualified immunity. Although these appeals do not raise the tradi-
tional clearly-established-law question for review, they nevertheless assert the
same interests and are generally reviewable on appeal.
E. Appeals from Orders Determining Defendant Was Not an "Official"
As the states continue to engage in privatization of their official duties,
such as allowing private corporations to run their prisons, appellate courts may
be flooded with interlocutory appeals from orders declaring that a defendant
was a "private" person not entitled to qualified immunity.242 Such orders do
not address the central qualified immunity question on appeal - whether the
law was clearly established. Instead they raise a different collateral issue -
whetherthe defendantwas an official. Such orders can meetthethree elements
of the collateral order doctrine depending upon how the defendants raise the
issue procedurally.243
In Wyatt v. Cole2' and Richardson v. McKnight,245 the Supreme Court
never discussed whether an interlocutory appeal would lie from an order
dismissing the qualified immunity defense because the defendant was a private
actor.246 In both cases, they addressed the merits of the appeal, not the question
of jurisdiction. Wyatt held that private defendants cannot assert qualified
immunity as a defense.247 It suggested that if another defense were available
to them, it would only provide a defense to liability, not an immunity from
suit.24 In Richardson, a sharply divided Court held that the defendants, prison
guards who were employed by a private corporation, could not assert qualified
242. See, e.g., Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100, 2102-03 (1997) (declaring that
privately employed prison guards are not entitled to immunity provided to their governmental
counterparts).
243. In reviewing an order denying official status, appellate courts should again note that
qualified immunity is a defense that can be first evaluated in a motion for summary judg-
ment before discovery, rather than in a motion to dismiss. See supra text accompanying notes
177-209.
244. 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
245. 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997).
246. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1982); Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100
(1997).
247. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 168.
248. Id. at 169.
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immunity as a defense. 49 In doing so, it explicitly left the door open for other
private actors to assert immunity.2 °
In light of Wyatt and Richardson, the question of whether the defendant
is an official is tremendously important and difficult to decide. If the district
court erroneously decides the status question, officials would lose their
immunity from suit just as if the district court had determined that the law was
clearly established. Such an order would subject the official to discovery and
a trial. An interlocutory appeal from this type of order safeguards the same
interests protected by the immunity-from-suit prong of the qualified immunity
defense. As such, it raises an important issue that is final, separate from the
merits, and unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.
Even when orders procedurally meet the elements of the collateral order
doctrine, another judicially created doctrine can significantly limit appellate
jurisdiction -the doctrine of frivolous appeals. An examination of the frivolity
doctrine in qualified appeals reveals how courts can discern jurisdiction and
further the purposes of the immunity-from-suit prong.
F. Orders Declaring Appeal to Be Frivolous:
The Dual Jurisdiction of the District and Appellate Courts
The right to be free from discovery and a trial, created by the immunity-
from-suit prong, is similar to the right to be free from being twice prosecuted
for the same offense,"' a right protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 2 Both existto safeguard
a defendant's right to be free from an unnecessary trial; qualified immunity
also seeks to bar unnecessary discovery. 3 As a result of this similarity, the
Supreme Court 4 and lower courts25 have applied the doctrine of frivolous
249. Richardson, 117S. Ct. at2107-08.
250. Id. at 2108 (stating that "we have answered the immunity question narrowly, in the
context in which it arose). The Court also noted that "[tihe case does not involve a private
individual briefly associated with a government body, serving as an adjunct to government in
an essential governmental activity, or acting under close official supervision." Id.
251. See, e.g., Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 841 (1996) (stating that interlocutory
appeals raising qualified immunity and double jeopardy are "analogous"); Chuman v. Wright,
960 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that similarityjustifies adoption ofjurisdictional rules
of doublejeopardy interlocutory appeals to qualified immunity appeals); Stewart v. Donges, 915
F.2d 572, 577 n.5 (10th Cir. 1990) (same); Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335, 1339 (7th Cir.
1989) (same).
252. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that no person shall be "subject forthe same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb").
253. See supra text accompanying notes 159-70.
254. See Behrens, 116 S. Ct. at 840-41.
255. See, e.g., Dickerson v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 251, 252 (6th Cir. 1994); Chuman, 960
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appeals in double jeopardy cases to interlocutory appeals raising qualified
immunity as a defense.
The purpose of the frivolity doctrine is to allow discovery or trials to go
forward because there is no colorable claim that an appeal would vindicate the
asserted right, whether under the Double Jeopardy Clause 6 or under the
qualified immunity defense. 7 This frivolity doctrine allows the appellate court
and the district court to have jurisdiction simultaneously in some circum-
stances." s To discern when the two courts simultaneously possessjurisdiction
requires an examination of the traditional rule ofjurisdiction in just one court
and the need for a limited application of this "dual jurisdiction.""u9
Under the traditional divestiture rule, once an official files atimely notice
of appeal, a district court losesjurisdiction." The purposes of this judge-made
rule are creating clarity in resolving who hasjurisdiction and avoiding unneces-
sary duplication of efforts." 1 The federal courts, using their supervisory
powers, crafted an exception to the divestiture rule when they created the
frivolity doctrine for interlocutory appeals.262
In the context of interlocutory appeals asserting doublejeopardy, the need
for simultaneous jurisdiction emerged when a criminal defendant filed an
interlocutory appeal from the district court's denial of his double jeopardy
motion.263 Under the traditional divestiture rule, the district court would lose
F.2d at 105; Stewart, 915 F.2d at 577 n.5; Apostol, 870 F.2d at 1339.
256. See, e.g., United States v. LaMere, 951 F.2d 1106,1108 (9th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Bradley, 905 F.2d 1482, 1485-86 (1 th Cir. 1990); United States v. Dunbar, 611 F.2d 985,
987-88 (5th Cir. 1980). See generally United States v. Claibome, 465 U.S. 1305, 1306 (1984)
(declining review of dual jurisdiction doctrine as applied to claim of selective prosecution).
257. See, e.g., Chuman v. Wright, 960 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir. 1992); Stewart v. Donges,
915 F.2d 572,577(10th Cir. 1990); Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335, 1339 (7th Cir. 1989).
258. See, e.g., Apostol, 870 F.2d at 1338-39 (finding dual jurisdiction for some qualified
immunity interlocutory appeals); Dunbar, 611 F.2d at 988 (finding dual jurisdiction for some
doublejeopardy interlocutory appeals). For a discussion of what courts mean by "dual jurisdic-
tion," see infra text accompanying notes 259-74.
259. See, e.g., LaMere, 951 F.2d at 1108 (stating that when criminal defendant files timely
notice of appeal, district court"loses it power to proceed... until the appeal is resolved" (quoting
United States v. Claibome, 727 F.2d 842, 850 (9th Cir. 1984))).
260. Id. (stating that divestiture rule is "ajudge made rule originally devised in the context
of civil appeals to avoid confusion or waste oftime resulting from having the same issues before
two courts at the same time" (quoting Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 850)).
261. Id.
262. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651,662 n.8 (1977) (urging federal appellate
courts to use their supervisory powers to "establish summary procedures... to weed out frivolous
claims of former jeopardy").
263. See, e.g., United States v. Dunbar, 611 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir. 1980). InDunbar, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals clearly stated the need to modify the rule ofjurisdiction in one
court:
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jurisdiction upon the criminal defendant's filing a notice of appeal.2" On
appeal, the appellate court would considerwhether the Double Jeopardy Clause
barred the trial. Without the concept of dual jurisdiction, a district court could
lose jurisdiction simply by the defendant's filing a frivolous interlocutory
appeal.26 If the district court acted withoutjurisdiction, any conviction would
be void.266
To allow the criminal trial court to proceed, appellate courts use their
supervisory powers to create the notion of dual jurisdiction.267 Under the
frivolity doctrine, a district court can retainjurisdiction if it conducts a hearing,
writes an order, and specifies why the appeal is frivolous .268 Once this is done,
the district court retains jurisdiction to proceed.
In the context of qualified immunity interlocutory appeals, district
courts similarly need to retain jurisdiction when appeals are frivolous. The
Supreme Court in Behrens v. Pelletier appropriately adopted this doctrine as
an important check upon multiple interlocutory appeals. 269 The goal of the
doctrine is to prevent officials from using unnecessary delay as a tactical
advantage.27
The jurisdictional issues under the frivolity doctrine are not simple. To
ascertain the district court's jurisdiction is easy, but to ascertain the appellate
court's simultaneous jurisdiction is complex. The district court retainsjuris-
The divestiture ofjurisdiction rule, applied in conjunction with [double jeopardy
interlocutory appeals], would enable a criminal defendant to unilaterally obtain a
trial continuance at any time prior to trial by merely filing adoublejeopardy motion,
however frivolous, and appealing the trial court's denial thereof
Id.; see also Claiborne, 727 F.2d at 851 (stating that "[a] ritualistic application of the divesti-
ture rule in the [doublejeopardy] context conflicts with the public policy favoring rapid adjudica-
tion of criminal prosecutions" (quoting United States v. Leppo, 634 F.2d 101, 104 (3d Cir.
1980))).
264. See, e.g., Griggs v. Provident ConsumerDiscount Co., 459 U.S. 56,58 (1982) (stating
that "[t]he filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance - it confers
jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects
of the case involved in the appeal").
265. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 24 F.3d 28, 31 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v.
LaMere, 951 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1991).
266. See, e.g., Dunbar, 611 F.2d at 986-87; see also Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572,578
n.8 (10th Cir. 1990) (voiding a civil trial because district court lacked jurisdiction by falling to
issue a frivolity order).
267. See, e.g.,LaMere, 951 F.2d at 1108 ; United States v. Bradley, 905 F.2d 1482,1485-86
(1 Ith Cir. 1990); Dunbar, 611 F.2d at 987-88.
268. See, e.g., Bradley, 905 F.2d at 1486; United States v. Hines, 689 F.2d 934, 936-37
(10th Cir. 1982).
269. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 841 (1996).
270. Id. (stating that certifying appeals as frivolous enable district court to retainjurisdiction
and minimizes disruption of ongoing proceedings).
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diction by issuing its frivolity determination,27" ' but it does not have the power
to dismiss a notice of appeal. 2 Two views of appellate jurisdiction currently
exist. The betterview finds simultaneousjurisdiction only when officials seek
a stay or mandamus. 73 The other view finds appellate jurisdiction implicit in
the notice of appeal, in which the official seeks review of the district court's
order denying qualified immunity.'
In the normal course of litigation, officials petition appellate courts for
a stay of discovery or trial proceedings. The purpose of seeking the stay or
mandamus is to protect the interests safeguarded by the immunity-from-suit
prong of the qualified immunity defense. Motions for a stay or mandamus give
the appellate courtjurisdiction to resolve three issues: whether to stay discov-
ery or a trial;275 whether the appeal is frivolous;276 and if the appeal is not
frivolous, whether the official has qualified immunity. 7
In addressing whether to grant a stay or issue mandamus, appellate courts
may use two distinct modes of analysis. Under the first approach, they could
271. See, e.g., Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572,577 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that presence
of district court's written findings of frivolity creates a "bright jurisdictional line between the
district court and the circuit court").
272. See Dickerson v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 251, 252 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that "district
courts have a ministerial duty to forward to the proper court of appeals any notice of appeal which
is filed" (citing FED. R. APP. P. 3(d))).
273. See, e.g., Marks v. Clarke, 102 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that "[a]fter
applying to the district court for a stay, the [officials'] should have applied to this court for a
discretionary stay to prevent the district court from proceeding to trial"); Chan v. Wodnicki, 67
F.3d 137,139 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that appellatejurisdiction is possible by official's "asking
us to stay the trial"); Chuman v. Wright, 960 F.2d 104, 105 n. 1 (1992); Apostol v. Gallion, 870
F.2d 1335, 1339 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that "[a] party aggrieved by a finding of frivolousness
or forfeiture [of the qualified immunity defense] ... may seek a stay from this court, for we have
jurisdiction to determine ourjurisdiction"); United States v. Farmer, 923 F.2d 1557,1565 (1 th
Cir. 1991) (stating that appellate jurisdiction exists from order denying doublejeopardy because
criminal defendant filed "emergency motion to stay the retrial pending consideration of the
interlocutory appeal").
274. See Langley v. Adams County, 987 F.3d 1473, 1476 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding dual
jurisdiction, after district court found appeal of one of four defendants to be frivolous and official
did not seek stay). See generally Dickerson, 37 F.3d at 252 (stating appellate court always has
jurisdiction to determine whether notice of appeal was valid, where official did not seek a stay
from frivolity order).
275. See infra text accompanying notes 278-79.
276. See, e.g., Stewart, 915 F.2d at 578 n.6 (stating that after filing stay official may argue
on appeal that interlocutory appeal is not frivolous).
277. See, e.g., Chan v. Wodnicki, 67 F.2d 137, 139 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that "[tihe claim
of immunity survives the denial of a stay"); Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 578 n.6 (10th Cir.
1990) (stating that denial of stay "at the appellate level would ordinarily be without prejudice
to the right of the defendant to argue the lack of frivolousness of his interlocutory appeal when
the matter is considered by the appellate courts on its merits").
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apply the traditional view that such relief is extraordinary and could generally
deny it using summary procedures.27 There are two advantages to this
approach. First, it maintains the view that such remedies are extraordinary,279
furthering a consistent interpretation of stays and mandamus. Second, it reveals
deference to the expertise of the district court. Presumably district courts are
well situated to determine if on the eve of trial such appeals are merely dilatory.
A contrasting and better approach is for the appellate court to use its
determination of whether the appeal is frivolous to determine whether to grant
the stay.280 If the district court were correct, then the appellate court could
summarily dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction. In that case, because of the concept
of dual jurisdiction, all district court proceedings conducted during the appeal
would have been with jurisdiction. The theory for the dismissal is that an
appeal from a frivolous order is a "nullity. ""2 '
If, however, the appeal was not frivolous, then the appellate court should
grant a stay to protect the officials' rights to be free from unnecessary discovery
and trials. By granting a stay after finding no frivolity, the appellate court is
implicitly recognizing that the remaining qualified immunity issue before it
is no different from other interlocutory appeals asserting qualified immunity.
Granting a stay would then eliminate the district court's dual jurisdiction.
Even if an official does not seek a stay, one court has suggested that its
jurisdiction arises from the denial of qualified immunity.282 Under this
approach, both courts still have jurisdiction. The district court's jurisdiction
comes from writing its frivolity determination and the appellate court's
jurisdiction from the denial of qualified immunity.283 In short, a court always
278. See, e.g., Stewart, 915 F.2d at 578 n.6 (stating that standards for seeking stay are "very
high" and that officials may later on appeal argue without prejudice that their appeal was not
frivolous).
279. See, e.g., Chan, 67 F.3d at 139 (stating that denying this request for "extraordinary
relief' does not "express any view of the merits of the underlying appeal"); Stewart, 915 F.2d
at 578 n.6.
280. See, e.g., United States v. Farmer, 923 F.2d 1557, 1565 n.17 (11 th Cir. 1991) (stating
that"[t]his court denied the motion to stay thus ruling on the district court's finding of frivolous-
ness").
281. See, e.g., Chan, 67 F.3d at 139 (stating that "[a]frivolous appeal is a nullity. .. ; it
does not engage the jurisdiction of the court of appeals, just as a frivolous suit does not engage
the jurisdiction of the district court").
282. Langley v. Adams County, 987 F.2d 1473, 1477 (10th Cir. 1993) (findingjurisdiction
even though official did not seek stay, when considering interlocutory appeals of three other
officials).
283. See Langley, 987 F.2d at 1477. In Langley, without analysis the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals discussed dual jurisdiction:
Once a district court so certifies a qualified immunity appeal as frivolous and thus
regains jurisdiction, that does not affect our jurisdiction. "Rather, both the district
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has "jurisdiction to determine [its] jurisdiction."" During this type of an
appeal, issues raised on interlocutory appeal can become moot."' For example,
the rights to be free from both discovery and a trial can become moot if the trial
concludes before appellate review." Atthatpoint, the only qualified-immunity
issue remaining is the defense to liability, an issue that can be raised on appeal
from the final judgment.
Presumably, when officials do not seek a stay or mandamus, the appellate
court'sjurisdiction can arguably be similar to jurisdiction under the traditional
view of stays and mandamus, where appellate courts often deny such relief.
In those situations, the appellate courts do not stop the district court's proceed-
ings, and the appellate courts need to resolve whether the appeal is frivolous
before deciding whether qualified immunity is available. If the appeal was
frivolous, both courts would dismiss for a lack ofjurisdiction. But if the courts
did not find the appeal frivolous, then the option of staying proceedings is
arguably lost. The only benefit of such an interlocutory appeal for officials
is that an appellate court could resolve the immunity in the official's favor,
ending the lawsuit. The problem with this view of dual jurisdiction is that it
fails to recognize the significance of a district court's frivolity determination.
Rarely, one hopes, would district courts be so misguided that they could not
distinguish among a frivolous claim, a nonfrivolous claim to immunity later
found debatable, and a nonfrivolous claim later found successful.
In addition to resolving the issue of appellate jurisdiction after a district
court issues a frivolity order, appellate courts may face the task of ascer-
tainingjurisdiction when district courts issue more than one frivolity determina-
tion. After each procedural motion, the official could erroneously attempt to
take an interlocutory appeal. A district court may thus be faced with the
task of issuing multiple frivolity determinations in a given case. Similarly,
if the appellate court has not intervened, the proceedings in the district
court may later suggest that an interlocutory appeal was proper. Thus, both
district courts and appellate courts need to know when an interlocutory
appeal will lie.
court and court of appeals shall have jurisdiction to proceed. Thus the defendant
is entitled ultimately to appellate review."
Id. (quoting United States v. Hines, 689 F.2d 934, 937 (10th Cir. 1982)).
284. Apostolv. Gallion, 870F.2d 1335,1339 (7th Cir. 1989). Yet, inApostol, the Seventh
Circuit required officials to seek a stay to invoke review of the denial of qualified immunity.
Id.
285. See, e.g., Chan v. Wodnicki, 67 F.3d 137, 139-40 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that denial
of stay was not on merits and thus it had jurisdiction to address qualified immunity, except for
mootness caused by concluded trial).
286. Id.
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V1 Conclusion
An interlocutory appeal from an order denying qualified immunity is a
powerful procedural tool for officials sued for violating a citizen's constitu-
tional rights. On appeal, officials may benefit from rulings that bar discovery,
bar a trial, or bar recovery for their constitutional violations. Officials get this
protection because qualified immunity is not only a defense to liability, but also
an immunity from suit- one that officials can raise numerous times before the
district court and sometimes during interlocutory appeals. As a result, injured
citizens may never have their day in court.
These potent appeals lie because ofthejudicially created collateral order
doctrine, which allows appeals in some circumstances before final judgment.
The purpose of the interlocutory appeal is to protect the interests safeguarded
by the immunity-from-suit prong of the Harlow qualified immunity standard-
an official's freedom from unnecessary discovery and trial. In theory, qualified
immunity benefits society. It allows officials to work instead of being tied up
in legal proceedings. In practice, courts have misconstrued qualified immunity,
allowing it to infringe upon the proper roles of district courts, juries, and
Congress. One important check on officials' undue delay of pretrial proceed-
ings and trials is the doctrine of frivolous appeals.
Ascertaining when appellate jurisdiction lies for interlocutory appeals
raising qualified immunity requires wading through the jurisdictional and
procedural morass created by the Supreme Court. The Court's jurisprudence
contains serious jurisdictional and procedural errors. First, it has rewritten the
Rules of Civil Procedure to suggest that interlocutory appeals can lie from
motions to dismiss. Second, it permits appellate courts to do the district courts'
job. When the district court fails to specify the facts it assumed in denying a
motion for summary judgment raising qualified immunity, it invites the
appellate court to pore through depositions, interrogatories, and affidavits. The
purpose of this extensive review of the record is for the appellate court to
determine what facts the record required the district court to assume. Third,
the Court failed to properly interpret the elements of the collateral order
doctrine when it suggested that appeals lie from motions to dismiss and allowed
appellate courts to make their own assessment of the assumed facts. The
Court's discussion impermissibly expands appellate jurisdiction, an area for
Congress to regulate.
The courts of appeal have similarly viewed their jurisdiction with few
limits. Some have granted appeals from motions to dismiss. Others have
resolved material disputed facts. Still others have failed to give appropriate
deference to the district court when supplementing the district court's assumed
facts in summaryjudgment motions or in discarding the district court's assumed
facts.
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The confusion resulting from both the Supreme Court'sjurisprudence and
the lower courts' response is clear. A critical examination of the Rules of Civil
Procedure and the collateral order doctrine, coupled with respect for the roles
of trial courts, juries, and Congress supports the following jurisdictional and
procedural observations.
First, multiple interlocutory appeals are possible because officials can
properly raise qualified immunity in motions for summary judgment both
before discovery and after discovery. An interlocutory appeal may also lie from
some orders denying protection from discovery. When a district court explic-
itly refuses to address whether the law was clearly established until discovery
has occurred, an appeal will lie if the official invites the district court to resolve
the clarity issue by using the plaintiff's version of the facts. Also appealable
is an order in which the district court determines that the defendant was not
an "official." Such a ruling means that the defendant cannot assert qualified
immunity as a defense. Each of these orders is consistent with the traditional
interpretations of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the collateral order doctrine.
Second, interlocutory appeals do not lie from every order denying quali-
fied immunity. For example, an interlocutory appeal will not lie from a motion
to dismiss, unless one is willing to have the Supreme Court judicially rewrite
the Rules of Civil Procedure, a task appropriately assigned to Congress.287 If
the appellate court were to grant qualified immunity, it would violate Rule
8(a)(2), which authorizes notice pleading. Appeals from such motions to
dismiss are also not final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the basis for the judicially
created collateral order doctrine.
Third, when the district court determines that there are material disputed
facts, appellate courts should examine "all of the conduct which the District
Court deemed sufficiently supported" and ask whether the law was clearly
established. By limiting itself to these assumed facts, the appellate court
resolves an issue for which it has jurisdiction. Combing the appellate record
for its own facts creates jurisdictional problems. The task of determining the
assumed facts is perilously close to delving into the merits of the claim, creating
a separability problem under the collateral order doctrine.
Fourth, an interlocutory appeal can lie even after a district court issues
an order stating that the appeal is frivolous. Under the concept ofdualjurisdic-
tion, both the district court and the appellate court can simultaneously have
jurisdiction in some circumstances. After denying qualified immunity, a district
court can retain jurisdiction even though an official files a notice of appeal.
The district court retains jurisdiction by writing an order explaining why the
287. The rewriting of the Rules of Civil Procedure is a task assigned to the United States
Supreme Court, on recommendation of the Judicial Conference, which relies on the Standing
Committee. This latter committee relies on the Advisory Committee. Congress may veto what
the Supreme Court promulgates.
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appeal is frivolous. To avoid simultaneousjurisdiction, the official must apply
to the appellate court for a stay or mandamus to stop proceedings in the district
court. In deciding whether to grant the stay, appellate courts should first decide
if the appeal is frivolous. If it is, then the appellate court should dismiss for
a lack ofjurisdiction. If it is not frivolous, the appellate court should grant a
stay. After granting the stay, it would probe more deeply the qualified immu-
nity question that the district court thought was frivolous.
The difficult task in determining whether to allow an interlocutory appeal
from a denial of qualified immunity is one facing not only appellate courts but
also district courts, the front line of civil rights litigation. Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Behrens, many courts of appeals had a rule of allowing
officials to take only one interlocutory appeal. Behrens' authorization will
encourage officials to seek more than one interlocutory appeal. District courts
will then have to determine which appeals are frivolous. In doing so, the
doctrine of dual jurisdiction for frivolous appeals could be an incredibly
important check on unnecessary interlocutory appeals.
